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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Recently-decided labor and employment law cases have given 
employees in the United States little reason to cheer.  With the National 
Labor Relations Board potentially denying collective bargaining rights to 
large groups of private sector employees in its recent Kentucky River 
supervisor trilogy rulings,1 and with public employees seeing First 
Amendment protections substantially diminished in so-called “official-
capacity” speech cases in light of the United State Supreme Court’s 
decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos,2 the lone bright spot for employees has 
been the robust interpretation given by the Supreme Court to anti-retaliation 
provisions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19643 in Burlington 
Northern & Santa Fe Railroad v. White.4 
With all of these highly important cases being decided during the past 
year, employment law commentators have paid little attention to the 
Solomon Amendment case of Rumsfeld v. FAIR5 and its discussion of the 
right to expressive association under the First Amendment.6  This is hardly 

1
  See Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 NLRB No. 37 (Sept. 29, 2006) 
(finding certain charge nurses in acute-care hospital fell within the 
definition of “supervisor” set forth in Section 2(11) of the National Labor 
Relations Act (“NLRA”)); Golden Crest Healthcare Center, 348 NLRB No. 
39 (Sept. 29, 2006) (concluding charge nurses at nursing home were not 
supervisors for purposes of the NLRA); and Croft Metals, Inc., 348 NLRB 
No. 38 (Sept. 29, 2006) (holding lead persons working in manufacturing 
facility were not supervisors under the Act).  As problematic as these 
decisions may become for the labor movement, at least some commentators 
believe the decisions could have been worse for unions.  See, e.g., Jeff 
Hirsch, Board Decides “Kentucky River” Cases, WORKPLACE PROF BLOG, 
at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2006/10/ 
board_decides_k.html (October 3, 2006) (“My personal take on these cases 
is that they're not great for unions, but they could have been worse.”). 
2
 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).  For a more in-depth consideration of Ceballos 
and its implications for public employee First Amendment rights, see infra 
Part V.B. 
3
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - §2000e-17 (2000). 
4
 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006) (eschewing more stringent standard in 
favor of one based on showing reasonable employee would have found 
retaliatory action materially adverse).  
5
 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006). 
6
 See id. at 1311-13.  
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surprising given the less than obvious employment law connections.  
Nevertheless, there are some very real, if unintended, employment law 
consequences stemming from this decision.   
Since the constitutional right to association was first recognized in the 
civil right cases of the 1950s and 1960s,7 there has never been a satisfactory 
conception of what groups make up protected associations for First 
Amendment purposes.  This fact has been lamented by Professor Andrew 
Morriss in his recent pre-FAIR piece8 as well as by others scholars.9  
Together, they point out that past Supreme Court expressive association 
cases like Roberts v. United States Jaycees,10 Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. 
Rotary Club on Duarte,11 and Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale,12 really do not say 
much, outside of their own examples, about how to determine who is and 
who is not an expressive association.13 
Not only did FAIR not help matters in this regard, but it made matters 
worse by inadvertently finding that public employers, in the guise of public 
law school members of the FAIR association,14 have expressive association 

7
 See infra Part III.A. 
8
 See Andrew P. Morriss, The Market for Legal Education & Freedom 
of Association: Why the "Solomon Amendment" Is Constitutional and Law 
Schools Are Not Expressive Associations, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
415, 444 (2005) (“The Supreme Court’s expressive association cases are … 
of little direct guidance on the question of what constitutes an expressive 
association largely because that issue has not yet arisen in a case before the 
Court.”). 
9
 See, e..g., Daniel A. Farber, Speaking in the First Person Plural: 
Expressive Associations and the First Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483 
(2001); Jason Mazzone, Freedom's Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639 
(2002). 
10
 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
11
 481 U.S. 537 (1987). 
12
 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
13
 See Farber, supra note 9, at 1498 (“So far, the Court has given us a 
series of examples without any defining principle.”); Mazzone, supra note 
9, at 680 (“As the doctrine of freedom of association has developed the 
examples are all the rules we have.”); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The 
Constitutional Rights of Private Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 215 
(2003) (“[O]ne looks in vain to Dale for some persuasive, principled, or 
even predictable limit on the First Amendment protections enjoyed by 
associations.”). 
14
 FAIR includes law schools as institutions and law school faculties, 
but both are treated collectively as “law schools” under the Court’s analysis 
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rights.15  Now, this point did not impact the decision in FAIR itself, because 
even though such institutions were expressive associations, it was found 
that the Solomon Amendment's requirement of equal access of military 
recruiters on law school campuses did not unconstitutionally burden law 
schools’ expressive association rights.16  Nevertheless, the future 
consequences could be far reaching if public employers are considered to 
have First Amendment rights to expressive association like the FAIR public 
law schools.  Specifically, this could mean that public employers would 
gain constitutional rights at the expense of pubic employees' civil liberties 
and civil rights.17    
Thankfully, it is hard to imagine that the Court, if faced with the 
question directly, would find that public employers have First Amendment 
rights of any kind.  This interpretation of the First Amendment is 
structurally unsound from the standpoint that the Bill of Rights protects the 
governed, not the governing.18  To the extent that public employers have 
interests in promoting messages consistent with their public mission and 
image, it is better to conceive of these interests as the same as those 
discussed in the Pickering19 line of cases concerning the need for 
governmental efficiency and lack of disruption in the public employment 
sector when discussing public employee First Amendment rights.20  
Moreover, in order to keep these governmental interest within reasonable 
bounds, the government speech doctrine discussed in Ceballos should be 
limited to those public employees who are specifically hired to promote the 
government’s message and not too all employees who engage in conduct 
pursuant to their job duties.21 
The purpose of this paper then is to point out an inadvertent error that 
the Court made in FAIR on its way to doing the heavy analytical lifting and 
thus, permit this judicial misstep to be corrected before the finding of public 

in FAIR.  See Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1302, 1312-13; see also 
infra note x.  Of the known members of the association, four are public law 
school faculties.  See infra note x. 
15
 See infra Part II.C.; see also Morriss, supra note 8, at 440 ("One 
indication that the lower courts [in FAIR] paid insufficient attention to this 
[expressive association] element is their failure to consider state law schools 
as members of FAIR.").     
16
 See FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1312-13. 
17
 See infra Part IV. 
18
 See infra Part V.A. 
19
 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
20
 See infra Part V.B.1. 
21
 See infra Part V.B.2. 
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employer expressive associations causes substantial harm to public 
employee civil liberties and civil rights in the workplace.  The paper also 
hopes to spur the Court in future cases to fashion a coherent constitutional 
analysis in these cases by utilizing the Pickering doctrine and limiting the 
application of the Ceballos government speech analysis. 
This article discusses in five parts the Supreme Court's recognition of 
public employer expressive associations in its Solomon Amendment 
decision and how the Court should rectify this state of affairs, consistent 
with the protection of public employee civil liberties and civil rights.  Part II 
explores in depth the Court’s decision in Rumsfeld v. FAIR, with a focus on 
the Court’s expressive association analysis.  Part III then examines the 
historically elusive meaning of what groups constitute expressive 
associations under previous Supreme Court precedent and explains how this 
lack of clarity could have contributed to its erroneous public employer 
expressive association finding in FAIR.  Next, Part IV outlines the 
detrimental consequences to public employees caused by this unintended 
constitutional development and provides examples to illustrate what 
recognition of these public expressive associations would mean to both 
public employees’ civil rights and civil liberties.  Part V concludes by 
arguing that the Court will eventually undo this mistake by relying on 
structural arguments about the Bill of Rights, but urges the Court to use this 
opportunity to fashion a workable framework for balancing public employer 
efficiency interests against public employee constitutional rights by 
utilizing the durable Pickering balancing test.  At the same time, this paper 
argues that the Court should modify its holding in Ceballosso that public 
employee constitutional rights are not needlessly sacrificed through an 
overblown application of the government speech doctrine.   
 
II. RUMSFELD V. FAIR 
 
A.  "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" and the Solomon Amendment 
 
The recently-decided First Amendment case of Rumsfeld v. Forum for 
Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR),22 also colloquially referred to as 
the Solomon Amendment case, stems from the very first days of the Clinton 
Administration in the early 1990s when a legislative compromise was 
struck concerning the inclusion of homosexual individuals within the 
American military services.23  Whereas previously the military had more 

22
 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006). 
23
 See Morriss, supra note 8, at 434 (discussing the history surrounding 
the military's DADT policy) (citing Eugene R. Milhizer, "Don't Ask, Don't 
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actively sought to exclude homosexual members from the military,24 the 
new “don’t ask, don’t tell” (DADT) policy shielded homosexuals from 
being dismissed from military service as long as they did not engage in 
homosexual acts, state that they were homosexuals, or marry a person of the 
same sex.25   Not surprisingly, most homosexuals and their supporters were 
unhappy with this compromise and continue to this day to fight to allow 
openly-gay individuals into military service.26  Nevertheless, the DADT 
policy remains in effect as of the writing of this article in early 2007 and has 
been found to be constitutional by several federal appellate courts.27 
In solidarity with opponents of the DADT policy and consistent with 
their own non-discrimination policies which, among things, prohibits 
recruiters from engaging in sexual orientation discrimination,28 a number of 
law schools began restricting access to their campuses by military 
recruiters.29   In response to these schools placing obstacles in the way of 
military recruiters, Congress enacted the Solomon Amendment which 
prevents colleges and universities from receiving certain federal funding30 if 

Tell": A Qualified Defense, 21 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 349, 351-66 
(2004)). 
24
 See id. 
25
 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(b) (West 1998). 
26
 For instance, the Service Members Legal Defense Network is 
currently mounting a campaign to persuade Congress to repeal the DADT 
policy and allow homosexuals to serve openly in the armed services.  See 
Service Member Legal Defense Network Take Action Lobby Day 2007, 
http://ga1.org/sldn/events/lobbyday07/details.tcl (last visited January 7, 
2007) (setting out information for group lobbying effort in March 2007 in 
Washington D.C. to repeal DADT). 
27
 See Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Holmes v. 
Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997).  The policy 
continues to be challenged on constitutional grounds, but without success.  
See Cook v. Rumsfeld, 429 F. Supp. 2d 385 (D. Mass. 2006) (dismissing 
challenge to DADT policy on Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a 
claim). 
28
 As of 1990, the Association of American Law Schools requires 
member schools to adopt nondiscrimination policies on the basis of sexual 
orientation. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction at 6, FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(No. 03 Civ. 4433 (JCL)).    
29
 See Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1302 (2006).   
30
 Although student financial assistance is not covered by the law, 
federal funding from the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, 
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they prohibit military recruiters "from gaining access to campuses, or access 
to students . . . on campuses, for purpose of military recruiting in a manner 
that is at least equal in quality and scope to the access to campuses and to 
students that is provided to any other employer."31    
Many law schools believed that the Solomon Amendment required them 
to choose between abandoning their nondiscrimination policies or lose a 
substantial amount of federal funding.32  A group of public and private law 
schools and faculties, called the Forum for Academic and Institutional 
Rights, Inc. (FAIR),33 sued for entry of a preliminary injunction against 
enforcement of the Solomon Amendment, arguing that the law 
impermissibly infringed on law schools' First Amendment rights of speech 
and association.34    
 

Transportation, Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, among 
other agencies, may be lost at the university-wide level if schools do not 
comply with the Solomon Amendment.  See 10 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1), (2).  
31
 Id. § 983(b) (Supp. 2005).  In its first iteration, the Solomon 
Amendment withdrew federal funds from higher education institutions that 
prevented military recruiters "from gaining entry to campuses."  However, 
the Department of Defense later adopted an informal policy that "entry to 
campus" meant that universities had to provide military recruiters access to 
their students equal in quality and scope as that provided to other recruiters.  
See FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 283 (D.N.J. 2003).  This equal 
access requirement was formally codified by Congress into the Solomon 
Amendment in 2004 as a result of litigation of this matter in the district 
court.  See Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 552, 118 Stat. 1811, 1911-12 
(2004). 
32
 See FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1303.  
33
 The declared mission of FAIR is "to promote academic freedom, 
support educational institutions in opposing discrimination and vindicate 
the rights of institutions of higher education."  See id. at 1302.  According to 
SolomonResponse.Org, FAIR consists of 36 participating law schools, 
including 24 faculties and 12 institutions.  See FAIR Participating Law 
Schools, SOLOMONRESPONSE.ORG, at http://www.law.georgetown.edu 
/solomon/participating_schools.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2007).  Of these, 
only 24 are publicly known, as the remaining members have chosen to 
remain anonymous for fear of retaliation from the government and private 
actors for their stance on this issue.  See FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 286.   
34
 FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1302. 
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B.  Rumsfeld v. FAIR 

After the district court found in favor of the government35 and then the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in a divided opinion and found in 
favor of FAIR,36 the United States Supreme Court unanimously37 found that 
the Solomon Amendment did not infringe FAIR's freedoms of speech and 
association under the First Amendment.  The Court's opinion can be divided 
into two parts: statutory and constitutional. 
 
1. The Statutory Argument 

In the first section, the Court considered whether the case could be 
disposed on statutory grounds as proposed by a brief filed by a number of 
law professor amici.38 These professors believed that the equal access 
requirement of the Solomon Amendment could be read to allow law schools 
to apply a general nondiscrimination policy to exclude military recruiters.  
In other words, as long as law schools excluded other recruiters that 
violated their nondiscrimination policies, it could treat military recruiters in 
the same fashion.39   The Court made short-shrift of this argument.  
As an initial matter, both the government and FAIR did not believe this 
to be the meaning of the equal access requirement of the Solomon 
Amendment.  Both read the statue to say that in order for a law school and 
its university to receive federal funding, the same access must be afforded 
to campus and students by military recruiters as that received by other non-
military recruiters.40  The Court agreed with the Government and FAIR, 
finding that the proper focus of the statute was not on the content of a 
school's recruiting policy, but instead on the result achieved by the policy.41  
At the end of the day, the Court observed, the Solomon Amendment 
requires that military recruiters must be given the same level of access to 
law schools as other recruiters who comply with the law schools' 

35
 See FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269 (D.N.J. 2003). 
36
 See FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004). 
37
 Justice Alito did not participate in the decision, so FAIR was actually 
an 8-0 decision. See FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1302. 
38
 See id. at 1304-05 (citing Brief for William Alford et al. as Amici 
Curiae 10-18; Brief for 56 Columbia Law School Faculty Members as 
Amici Curiae 6-15). 
39
 Id. at 1305. 
40
 Id. at 1304. 
41
 Id. at 1305 
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nondiscrimination policies.42 
 
2. The Constitutional Arguments 

Having rejected the statutory argument, the Court next considered 
whether the First Amendment prevented the government from imposing the 
Solomon Amendment access requirements on law schools.  The Court 
began with the proposition that Congress has great latitude in enacting 
legislation to raise and support armies43 and requiring campus access for 
military recruiters falls under that power unless Congress exceeds other 
constitutional limitations, such as those imposed by the First Amendment.44  
Nevertheless, even though the power to raise and support armies is subject 
to First Amendment constraints, more deference has been historically given 
to Congress when it enacts military-related legislation.45   
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in finding for FAIR, had concluded 
that the conditions placed on university federal funding by the Solomon 
Amendment amounted to an impermissible unconstitutional condition and 
therefore, exceeded the constitutional limitations placed on Congress’ 
power to raise and support armies.46  Under the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions, "the government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis 
that infringes his constitutionally protected … freedom of speech even if he 

42
 Id. ("Applying the same policy to all recruiters is therefore 
insufficient to comply with the statute if it results in a greater level of access 
for other recruiters than for the military.").  The Court also pointed out that 
the recent amendments to the Solomon Amendment would make little sense 
if the amici professors interpretation of the statute were adopted. See id.  at 
1305-06 ("Under amici's interpretation, this legislative change had no effect 
-- law schools could still restrict military access, so long as they do so under 
a generally applicable nondiscrimination policy . . . . That is rather clearly 
not what Congress had in mind in codifying the DOD policy.") (emphasis in 
original).  
43
 Congress has the power to "provide for the common Defence," "[t]o 
raise and support Armies," and "[t]o provide and maintain a Navy," under 
Article I of the Constitution.  U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, cls. 1, 12-13.  
44
 FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1306. 
45
 Id. (citing Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981) ("[J]udicial 
deference … is at its apogee" when Congress legislates under its authority 
to raise and support armies)).   
46
 See id. at 1304 (citing FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 229-243 (3d 
Cir. 2004)). 
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has no entitlement to that benefit."47  The law schools argued that the 
Solomon Amendment placed an unconstitutional condition on them because 
it forced them to choose between forfeiting their First Amendment rights 
and losing federal funding for their schools.48  The Court observed, 
however, that a funding condition is not unconstitutional if it could be 
constitutionally imposed directly,49 and therefore considered next whether 
directly imposing the Solomon Amendment's access requirement would 
violate the law schools' First Amendment rights to free speech or 
association. 
 
 a. Free Speech Arguments 

The Court first explored three different constitutional free speech 
arguments made by FAIR.50  FAIR argued that the Solomon Amendment 
compelled them to speak the Government's message, required them to host 
or accommodate the military's speech, and unconstitutionally infringed on 
their right to engage in expressive conduct.51  The Court rejected all three of 
these arguments, finding generally that the Solomon Amendment did not 
require the FAIR schools to say or do anything.52   More specifically, the 
Court found that there was not a government-mandated pledge or motto that 

47
 Id. at 1307 (citing United States v. American Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 
U.S. 194, 210 (2003)).  
48
 Id. at 1304. 
49
 Id. at 1307 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)). 
50
 Because the free speech contentions in FAIR are not central to the 
argument in this paper, it is enough to provide a cursory overview of these 
arguments and their resolution by the Court.  The Court also cursorily 
rejected a fourth argument adopted by the Third Circuit that the Solomon 
Amendment violated the First Amendment because it compelled the law 
schools to subsidize government speech.  See id. at 1307 n.4.  In Johanns v. 
Livestock Marketing Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005), however, the Court 
made clear that citizens no longer have a First Amendment right not to fund 
government speech and thus, it found no basis for a First Amendment 
challenge on these grounds.  
This article returns later to this government speech doctrine in the public 
employment context in discussing how employee First Amendment 
constitutional rights and public employer efficiency interests should be 
balanced.  See infra Part V.B.2. 
51
 FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1307. 
52
 Id. 
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the law schools had to endorse as in West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette53 
or Wooley v. Maynard,54 there was no requirement that the law schools 
accommodate a government message that interfered with the law school's 
desired message as in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual 
Group of Boston, Inc.,55 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of 
Cal.,56 or Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,57 and there was no 
conduct that amounted to expressive conduct as in United States v. 
O'Brien58 or Texas v. Johnson.59 
  
 b. Associational Arguments 
 
Having determined that the Solomon Amendment did not violate the 
law schools' freedom of speech, the Court next turned to whether the law 

53
 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding unconstitutional state law that 
required school children to recite the pledge of allegiance in school). 
54
 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding unconstitutional state law that 
required New Hampshire motorists to place on their automobiles' license 
plates the state motto "Live Free or Die"). 
55
 515 U.S. 557, 566 (1995) (holding unconstitutional state law 
requiring parade to include group with message was antithetical to those of 
the parade organizers).  With regard to Hurley, the Court concluded that 
unlike the decision surrounding who participates in a parade, allowing 
military recruiters on law school campuses is not inherently expressive, and 
does not sufficiently interfere with any message the law school wishes to 
send.   See FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1309-10.  
56
 475 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1986) (plurality opinion) (holding unconstitutional 
law that allows state utility commission to place third-party newsletter in 
electric company billing envelopes). 
57
 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding unconstitutional right-of-reply 
state statute that violated newspaper's right to determine content of their 
publication). 
58
 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (holding that burning of draft card 
expressive conduct subject to First Amendment protection). 
59
 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (holding that burning American flag 
expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment).  Even if the O'Brien 
test was appropriately applicable to the expressive conduct in FAIR, the 
Court concluded in the alternative that the Solomon Amendment was a 
neutral regulation that promoted a substantial governmental interest (i.e., 
raising and supporting armies) that would be achieved less effectively 
absent the regulation.  See FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1311 (citing United States v. 
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)). 
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violated the schools' rights to expressive association as outlined in the case 
of Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.60  Although neither the right to 
expressive association, nor any other type of "association," is found within 
the text of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution,61 such a 
right has nevertheless been implicitly found in the Constitution by the 
Court.62  This is because the ability to associate with others increases one's 
ability to engage in expression protected by the Constitution.63  In this 
regard, the Supreme Court has commented that an "individual's freedom to 
speak, to worship, and to petition the Government for the redress of 
grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference by the state 
unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends 

60
 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (holding New Jersey public accommodation 
statute unconstitutional because it violated the Boy Scouts’ expressive 
association rights by requiring them to accept a homosexual assistant 
scoutmaster as a member).  
61
  U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances."). 
62
  See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) 
("[W]e have long understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities 
protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with 
other in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, 
religious, and cultural ends."); see also NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. 
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958) (labeling such rights as an 
indispensable part liberty on the same plane as the rights to speech, press, or 
association). 
63
  Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460.  Professor Chemerinksy explains more 
practically that because groups have resources in human capital and money, 
such groups enhance an individual's freedom to engage in protected 
constitutional activities.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1113 (2d ed. 2002); see also New York State 
Club Assoc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988) ("The ability and 
opportunity to combine with others to advance one's view is a powerful 
practical means of ensuring the perpetuation of the freedoms the First 
Amendment has guaranteed to individuals as against the government."); 
Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After 
Dale: A Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1519 (2001) ("[The 
First Amendment's] chief value may be the role it plays in protecting people 
who want to combine with others to promote common causes.").  
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were not also guaranteed."64   FAIR argued that the Solomon Amendment 
violated the law schools' rights to expressive association by inhibiting their 
ability to express their message that discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation is wrong by forcing them to have military recruiters on their 
campuses.65 
As outlined in Dale and other expressive association cases, such claims 
require that three elements be established: (1) the group is an expressive 
association; (2) forced inclusion of outsiders would significantly affect the 
group's expression, and (3) the government's interests do not justify this 
intrusion.66  In FAIR, the Court spent much time on the second and third 
elements on the law schools' expressive association claim, but very little on 
the first.    
Finding without analysis that FAIR was an expressive association,67 the 
Court concluded that the Solomon Amendment did not significantly burden 
the law schools' associational rights and thus, did not need to waste ink on 
justifying the government's intrusion on those rights.68  More specifically, 
the Court concluded that although law schools associate to some extent with 
military recruiters in that they interact with them, these same recruiters do 
not come to campus seeking to become members of the schools' expressive 
association.69  Moreover, even though the right to expressive association 
protects more than just membership decisions, the Solomon Amendment 
also does not make group membership in the law schools less attractive, as 
law school students and faculty are free to voice their disapproval of the 
military's DADT policy while the recruiters are on campus.70   
Having come to this determination on FAIR’s expressive association 

64
 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622; FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1312 
(2006) ("If the government were free to restrict individuals' ability to join 
together and speak, it could essentially silence the views that the First 
Amendment is intended to protect.").  
65
 FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1312. 
66
 Id. (citing Dale, 530 U.S. at 655-59). 
67
 The missing part of the FAIR Court’s expressive association analysis 
is discussed in detail infra Part II.C. 
68
 FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1312.  
69
 Id.  In other words, there is no expressive association violation 
because "the Solomon Amendment does not force a law school 'to accept 
members it does not desire.'"  Id. (quoting in part Dale, 530 U.S. at 648; 
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623). 
70
 Id. at 1312-13 ("A military recruiter's mere presence on campus does 
not violate a law school's right to associate, regardless of how repugnant the 
law school considers the recruiter's message.").  
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claims, the court concluded that the Solomon Amendment neither violated 
the FAIR law schools' free speech nor association rights, finding instead 
that FAIR "had attempted to stretch a number of First Amendment doctrines 
well beyond the sort of activities these doctrines protect."71 
 
C.  The Missing Expressive Association Analysis 

But the Court is the one who seems to have unwittingly "stretched" one 
First Amendment doctrine too far by not taking the time to analyze whether 
all members of FAIR, including its state law school members, should have 
expressive association rights.72  With regard to whether FAIR is an 
expressive association, all the Court stated in this regard is the following: 
 
• "The Solomon Amendment, however, does not similarly affect a 
law school's associational rights."73 
 
• "Recruiters are, by definition, outsiders who come onto campus 
for  the limited purpose of trying to hire students -- not to 
become members of the school's expressive association."74 
 
• "The Solomon Amendment has no similar effect on a law 
school's associational rights."75 
 
• "The Solomon Amendment therefore does not violate a law 
school's First Amendment rights.  A military recruiter's mere 
presence on campus does not violate a law school's right to 
associate, regardless of how repugnant the law school considers 
the recruiter's message."76 
 
Note that in all of these passages from the opinion the Court is not assuming 
for the sake of argument that FAIR is an expressive association, it is saying 
that FAIR is an expressive association and doing so with a glaring absence 

71
 Id. at 1313. 
72
 See Morriss, supra note 8, at 440 ("One indication that the lower 
courts [in FAIR] paid insufficient attention to this [expressive association] 
element is their failure to consider state law schools as members of 
FAIR.”). 
73
 FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1312  (emphasis added). 
74
 Id. (emphasis added). 
75
 Id. at 1313 (emphasis added). 
76
 Id. (emphasis added). 
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of any analysis on this point whatsoever.77   
So what's the big deal?  After all, FAIR lost the case.  No harm, no foul.  
The issue lurking is that the Court implies that public law schools, as 
members of the FAIR association, have expressive association rights.78  

77
 Accord David Fagundes, State Actors As First Amendment Speakers, 
100 N.W. U. L. REV. 1637, 1685 (Summer 2006) (noting in FAIR that, 
“[a]lthough the Court did not explicitly address the issue of state actors' 
First Amendment rights, its decision proceeded on the premise that both 
public and private universities possess constitutional speech rights.”); see 
also Morriss, supra note 8, at 416 (arguing that the Third Circuit in FAIR 
improperly treated the law schools and their faculties as worthy of 
associational freedom claims). 
78
 As far as public versus private members of FAIR, of the known 
members, there are no public institutions and four public faculties: The 
Faculty of the City University of NY (CUNY) Law School, The Faculty of 
the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law, The Faculty of the 
University of Minnesota Law School, and The Faculty of the University of 
Puerto Rico Law School.  See FAIR Participating Law Schools, supra note 
x.  As far as institutional membership versus faculty membership, the FAIR 
Court does not make any distinction between FAIR in this regard in any 
part of its analysis, see supra note x, suggesting that recognition of FAIR 
law school faculties as expressive associations is tantamount to recognizing 
public law schools as expressive associations for purposes of the First 
Amendment analysis. Accord Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156, 185 
(D. Conn. 2005) (finding Yale Law School Faculty members may 
successfully assert expressive association claim on behalf of Yale Law 
School in another challenge to the Solomon Amendment).   
Interestingly, in the Burt case in an early decision by the same Court, 
the Department of Defense defended on the ground that, “Yale University, 
not the Faculty, is the proper party to bring these claims.” Id. at 160.  But in 
that earlier case, the Court found that the Faculty Members “were the 
governing body of YLS.” Burt v. Rumsfeld, 322 F.Supp.2d 189, 199-200 
(D. Conn. 2004).  Thus, whether law faculties may be able to assert an 
expressive association claim on behalf of their law schools may in turn 
depend on whether they establish the rules, by majority, that govern and 
regulate their law school.  See also Morriss, supra note 8, at 452 n. 161 (in 
discussing the membership of FAIR commenting that, “[i]t is unclear what 
distinction is intended by the description of ‘about half’ of FAIR's members 
as ‘law schools’ and the other half as ‘law faculties.’ It may indicate 
something about the official position of the dean.”).   For purposes of this 
article, it is assumed that at least one, if not more, of the FAIR public law 
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And even though the Court found in FAIR itself that those rights were not 
significantly burdened by the Solomon Amendment and there was not a 
First Amendment violation, one could foresee these public law schools and 
other public employers generally, arguing in future cases that their 
expressive association rights permit them to not accept employee members 
they do not desire.79  Indeed, the FAIR Court's expressive association 
analysis hinges to a large degree on the critical point that military recruiters 
were not seeking to become “members” of the schools’ expressive 
association.80  On the other hand, employees in the form of faculty and staff 
seek to become such members and FAIR, consistent with Dale, suggests 
that expressive association rights give a group the ability not to accept 
members it does not want.81   
Nor is there anything in past Supreme Court precedent to suggest that 
employers per se cannot be expressive associations.   In fact, the Court in 
Hishon v. King & Spalding implied just the opposite.82  Such recognition of 
public employer constitutional rights could cause a seismic shift in the on-
going balancing of competing public employer and public employee 
interests, with the likely result being the diminishment of civil liberties and 
civil rights for public employees.   
In order to explain how the Court arrived at this unintended state of 
affairs, the next section explores how previous expressive association cases 
have provided little clue, beyond their own examples, as to the meaning of 
an expressive association.  The hope is that this brief review of previous 
expressive association cases will clarify how the FAIR Court could have 
blundered, unanimously, into this significant, inadvertent constitutional 

school faculties have the same powers in this regard as the Yale Law School 
Faculty and could bring expressive association claims on behalf of their law 
schools. 
79
 For a discussion of the implication of public employer expressive 
associations on employee civil rights and civil liberties, see infra Parts IV.B 
and IV.C. 
80
 FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1312. 
81
 Id.;  Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000). 
82
 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (conceding employers could have rights to 
association for certain purposes, such as when they make distinctive 
contributions to ideas and beliefs of society).  That being said, not all 
employment decisions are necessarily expressive.  See Carpenter, supra 
note 63, at 1577 (pointing out that a school might have expressive 
association rights when it chooses teachers, who are hired to instill children 
with values, but not when selecting maintenance or secretary personnel).  
For a more in-depth examination of Hishon, see infra Part III.A.3. 
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holding.   
 
III. THE HISTORICALLY ELUSIVE MEANING OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION  
   
The following narrative places emphasis on exactly how the United 
States Supreme Court has determined whether a group qualifies as an 
expressive association, as opposed to whether the Court found an expressive 
association violation.  As will become clear, the Court has yet to articulate 
an adequate definition for this constitutional concept.    
 
A.  Historical Foundations (1958-1984) 

1. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson
 
Interestingly enough, the development of expressive association rights 
closely mirrors the progress of the civil rights movement of the second half 
of the 20th Century.  Indeed, it was in the 1958 Supreme Court decision of 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson83 that the Court first noted that the 
ability to associate was a necessary predicate to being able to more fully 
exercise one's constitutional rights, including and especially those contained 
in the First Amendment.84 
In Patterson, in furtherance of a transparent attempt to oust the NAACP 
from the state, Alabama sought the production of many documents 
including the name and addresses of all NAACP members.85  In an opinion 
by Justice Harlan, the Court unanimously found that Alabama could not 
compel the NAACP to disclose its membership lists consistent with the 
NAACP's members' rights to associate with others to promote its common 

83
  357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
84
 Id. at 460.  Other commentators have commenced their historical 
exploration of the expressive association right with earlier cases.  See, e.g., 
Carpenter, supra note 63, at 1520-21 (starting expressive association 
analysis with cases surrounding Espionage Act of 1917); McGowan, supra 
note 13, at 126 (beginning historical analysis of expressive association right 
with the Court's opinion in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 
(1875)).  Although there are plausible reasons to start the historical analysis 
at other places, I start with Patterson because it represents the first time that 
the Supreme Court explicitly recognized a First Amendment right to 
freedom of association, see Carpenter, supra note 63, at 1524, and this 
paper’s focus is on what constitutes a constitutionally-protected expressive 
association. 
85
  Patterson, 357 U.S. at 453. 
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integrationist views.86  In support of this conclusion, the court noted that 
effective advocacy on behalf of one's cause is enhanced by group 
association.87   Moreover, outing the NAACP members would make 
membership in the group less attractive, thereby putting a substantial 
restraint on the members’ freedom to associate for a common cause.88 
Notably, the discussion of the right to associate in Patterson assumes 
the right to associate belongs to the members of the group, not to the group 
itself.89   In other words, there is no argument in Patterson that the NAACP 
itself had a right to association as an entity.  Consequently, at this early time 
in the development of the doctrine, there was no need for a conception of 
what groups constitute constitutionally protected associations. 
  
2. NAACP v. Button 
 
A few years later, the Supreme Court again had occasion to consider the 
scope of associational rights in another case concerning the NAACP, 
although this time the Court recognized the NAACP itself had rights to 
association.  At issue in NAACP v. Button90 was whether Virginia could 
prevent the NAACP from recruiting parents to participate in desegregation 
cases.91   The Supreme Court again found in favor of the NAACP, finding 
that its activities were types of expression and association protected by the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments.92   
In coming to this conclusion, the Court recognized that organizations 
like the NAACP possess rights to associate, separate and apart from the 
rights of their members, to engage in such association for the purposes of 
advocacy.93  Perhaps because the NAACP was an expressive association 

86
 Id. at 466. 
87
 Id. at 460. Specifically, the Court found that, "[i]t is beyond debate 
that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and 
ideas is an inseparable aspect of 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech."  Id. 
88
 Id. at 462 (“Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many 
circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, 
particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”). 
89
 Id. (referring to the associational rights at issue in Patterson as 
members rights to freedom of association); see also id. at 466 (commenting 
that NAACP claiming rights to association on behalf of its members).  
90
 371 U.S .415 (1963). 
91
 Id. at 421.   
92
 Id. at 428-29. 
93
 See id. ("We think [the NAACP] may assert this right on its own 
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par excellence, the Court did not undertake an independent analysis to 
determine if the nature of the group was sufficiently expressive to qualify 
for First Amendment protection.   In any event, after Button, there was still 
no indication of how to determine which groups did and did not have 
associational freedoms under the First Amendment. 
  
3. Hishon v. King & Spalding 
 
After Patterson and Button, there then followed in the 1970s two cases 
involving racially discriminatory private schools and their rights to 
association.94  In both of these cases, however, private schools were again 
assumed, without analysis, to constitute associations for constitutional 
purposes (even those such claims ended up being trumped by state 
interests).  However, in 1984, the Court considered a question which had 
not been addressed before; namely, whether private employers could be 
considered associations due constitutional protection.   
Hishon v. King & Spalding95 concerned a law firm partnership decision 
which was alleged to be based on unlawful gender discrimination in 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.96  On the Title VII 
issue in contention, the Court found that such partnership decisions were 
rightly considered a term, condition, or privilege of employment, and 
therefore, a covered employment decision under Title VII.97  One of the law 
firm's arguments against this finding was that such an interpretation of Title 
VII would unconstitutionally interfere with the law firm's rights to 

behalf, because, though a corporation, it is directly engaged in those 
activities, claimed to be constitutional protected, which the [Virginia] statue 
would curtail.") (citing Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 
(1936)).  Grosjean held that "a corporation is a 'person' within the meaning 
of the equal protection and due process of law clauses."  297 U.S. at 244 
(citing Covington & L. Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 
(1896); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522 (1898)).  
94
 See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (holding Mississippi 
textbook loan program unconstitutional in lending textbooks to students in 
racially discriminatory private schools and finding that state need not 
subsidize more effective exercise of private school's right to association); 
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (finding federal civil rights law 
prohibits racially discriminatory admission practices at private schools even 
assuming schools have associational rights). 
95
 467 U.S. 69 (1984). 
96
 Id. at 71-72 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - §2000e-17 (2000)). 
97
 Hishon, 467 U.S. at 77-78. 
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association by requiring it to invite unwanted members into its partnership 
ranks.98    
The Court, however, rejected this argument.  Although conceding that 
employers and their member employees could have rights to association for 
certain purposes, such as when employees make distinctive contributions to 
the ideas and beliefs of society (as did the NAACP),99 such rights do not 
exist when the employment decision by the association does not implicate 
these loftier goals.100   In other words, not all employers are expressive 
associations.   Employers only have expressive association rights to the 
extent that they engage in expressive activities and employing a given 
individual would detract from the message they seek to promote.101   
However, because the discussion of associational rights is so short and 
cryptic in Hishon, it is difficult to say what proposition the case actually 
stands for beyond that employers may be associations due constitutional 
protections in some circumstances. 
    
B.  The Modern Cases (1984-2006) 
 
1. Roberts v. United States Jaycees 
 
A mere six weeks after the decision in Hishon, the landmark case of 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees102 broke new ground in the realm of the 
freedom of association by introducing an instructive dichotomy.  Justice 
Brennan's innovation in Roberts is that he classified all previously-decided 
association cases into two categories.   The right to intimate association 
concerns rights to personal liberty located within the due process clause of 
the 14th amendment.103  The right to expressive association, on the other 
hand, involves association for the promotion of rights found primarily 
within the First Amendment.104  The nature and degree of constitutional 

98
  Id. at 78. 
99
 See id. (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963)).  
100
 Id.; see also Roberts v. United State Jaycees,468 U.S. 609, 637 
(1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) ("[O]rdinary law practice for commercial 
ends has never been given special First Amendment protection …. We 
emphasized this point only this term in Hishon v. King & Spalding."). 
101
 Carpenter, supra note 63, at 1577 (maintaining schools might have 
expressive association rights in the employment context when the 
employees are central to the expressive activity of the schools).  
102
 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
103
 Id. at 618.   
104
 Id.  
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protection depends on the type of association in which a group engages.105 
In Roberts, the state interference at issue involved the application of 
Minnesota's state public accommodation statute's gender discrimination 
provisions to the membership policies of the Jaycees, which did not grant 
women full membership in their organization.106  The Court first explained 
that the Jaycees were not an intimate association because of its size, lack of 
selectivity in defining group membership, and its generally open, public 
nature.107  Having eliminated intimate association from consideration, the 
Court recognized the Jaycees as a type of expressive association whose 
members affiliated with one another to advocate certain views.108   
However, the analysis of why the Jaycees are an expressive organization 
is very case specific.   After making the broad statement that, "we have long 
understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the 
First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of 
a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and 
cultural ends,"109 the Court concludes that "in view of the various protected 
activities which the Jaycees engage . . .  the right is plainly implicated in 
this case."110  In turn, Jaycees activities are described later in the opinion as 
taking public positions on a number of diverse issues and regularly 
engaging "in a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising, and other 
activities worthy of constitutional protection under the First 

105
 Id.  
106
 Id. at 612-17. 
107
 Id. at 620-21.  Not surprisingly, the Court also found employers do 
not have rights of intimate association when selecting employees. See id. at 
620 ("[T]he Constitution undoubtedly imposes constraints on the State's 
power to control the selection of one's spouse that would not apply to 
regulations affecting the choice of one's fellow employees."). 
108
 Id. at 622.  Even though the Court concluded that the Jaycees had 
expressive association rights and those rights were significantly burden by 
the application of the public accommodation statute, see id. at 623 ("There 
can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or 
affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the group to accept 
members it does not desire.”), the Court nevertheless held that the State’s 
compelling interest in eradicating gender discrimination justified the 
infringement on the group’s rights. Id. (finding infringements of expressive 
association rights justified if state law serves "compelling state interests, 
unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through 
means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.").   
109
 Id.  
110
 Id. 
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Amendment."111  Thus, in its first foray into describing what groups 
constitute an expressive association for First Amendment purposes, the 
Court gives us an example of an expressive association without any 
defining or limiting principles.112     
In addition to Justice Brennan's majority opinion for the Court in 
Roberts, Justice O'Connor also wrote a concurrence, that while never 
adopted by the Court, is significant because it sets the stage in some 
respects for the next significant expressive association case of Dale v. Boy 
Scouts of Am.113  In particular, O'Connor's opinion places emphasis on the 
type of association as opposed to the content of the group message.   
O’Connor also advances an interesting way of thinking about whether 
employers should be considered to have expressive association rights.   
Contrary to Justice Brennan's dichotomy, Justice O'Connor suggests that 
non-intimate association cases should be further broken down into 
expressive association cases and commercial association cases in order to 
accord sufficient protection to expressive associations, while at the same 
time placing appropriate burdens on groups claiming the protection of the 
First Amendment for commercial association purposes.114  Whereas those 
associations that were predominantly expressive were due substantial 
protection from governmental interference,115 O'Connor argued that 
commercial associations were largely non-expressive and, therefore, state 
regulation was permissible as long as it was rationally related to a legitimate 
government purpose.116  Indeed, this is how O'Connor characterized the 
Hishon decision: as nothing more than a large law firm engaging in 
commercial associations lacking expressive content.117  Further, Justice 
O'Connor suggests that most employment is part of a commercial 

111
 Id. at 626-27. 
112
 David McGowan, Making Sense of Dale, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 121, 
132 (2001); Hills, supra note x, at 215. 
113
 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
114
 Id. at 632 (O'Connor, J., concurring).  Nevertheless, O'Connor does 
recognize that "[m]any associations cannot readily be described as purely 
expressive or purely commercial" and that, "[t]he standard for deciding just 
how much of an association's involvement in commercial activity is enough 
to suspend the association's First Amendment right to control its 
membership cannot . . . be articulated with simple precision."  Id. at 635.   
115
 Id. at 633. 
116
 Id. at 634-635.    
117
 Id. at 637 ("[O]rdinary law practice for commercial ends has never 
been given special First Amendment protection . . . . We emphasized this 
point only this term in Hishon v. King & Spalding.").  
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association which can be readily regulated by states without fear of 
impinging upon any constitutional right to association.118     
Interestingly, and based on these "radically different constitutional 
protections for expressive and non-expressive associations," O'Connor ends 
up concurring in the judgment of the Court that the Jaycees may not rely on 
an expressive association right to immunize themselves from the application 
of the Minnesota public accommodation statute.119   Contrary to the 
majority, however, Justice O'Connor finds the Jaycee primarily “promote 
and practice the art of solicitation and management,” a distinct commercial 
enterprise, and thus are subject to state regulation that meets low level 
rational basis review.120 
Justice O'Connor thus provides a more helpful test for determining 
which groups constitute expressive associations, especially in the 
commercial/employment arena.121   It is also clearly supplies a more 
rigorous analysis than Justice Brennan's "I know it when I see it" approach.  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in the 23 years since Roberts has not made 
any move to expressly adopt Justice O'Connor's commercial association 
test.122  Perhaps if it had, much of the mischief caused by the FAIR 
decision’s implicit finding of public employer expressive associations 
would have been avoided, as under Justice O'Connor's model most public 
employers would be considered commercial associations due limited 

118
 Id. at 634 ("The Constitution does not guarantee the right to choose 
employees . . . or those who engage in simple commercial transactions, 
without restraint from the State.").  In this regard, O'Connor maintains: “An 
association must choose its market. Once it enters the marketplace of 
commerce in any substantial degree it loses the complete control over its 
membership that it would otherwise enjoy if it confined its affairs to the 
market place of ideas.” Id. at 636.  
119
 Id. at 638-40. 
120
 Id. at 639.  
121
 Accord Farber, supra note 9, at 1498 (“The most serious effort to 
explain and justify the special treatment for expressive associations is found 
in Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Roberts.”); see also Carpenter, supra 
note 63, at 1517 (extending O'Connor's Roberts concurrence and arguing 
for tripartite approach that treats associations differently depending on the 
predominance of protected expression in their activities). 
122
 But see Carpenter, supra note 63, at 1564 (arguing that although 
Court has never adopted Justice O'Connor's commercial association 
framework that subsequent case outcomes can be readily explained by 
reference to that framework). 
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constitutional protection.123 
 
2. Pre-Dale Cases: Rotary Club of Duarte, New York State Club 
Assoc., and Stanglin 
 
In any event, the Court continued on its case-by-case approach in 
deciding which groups constituted expressive associations.  After Roberts, 
there were three further Supreme Court cases in the late 1980s, including 
Rotary Club of Duarte and New York State Club Assoc., both of which 
engaged in a case specific expressive association analysis of the clubs at 
issue.124  Like Roberts itself, these two cases came out in favor of the 
government's right to regulate these associations even in light of the 
presence of expressive association rights held by some of these groups.125   
With regard to whether the groups at issue qualified as expressive 
associations, the Court failed again to provide a concrete framework for this 
constitutional inquiry.  For instance, even though in Rotary Club of Duarte 
the Court concluded that the Rotary Club engaged in expressive activities 
which were quite limited,126 the Court, undeterred, and with the slightest of 
explanations, finds the Club implicitly constitutes an expressive 
association.127  Similarly, in New York State Club Association, the Court 

123
 But see Hills, supra note 113, at 217 (“The difficulty with Justice 
O'Connor's theory … is that it places unsupportable weight on the 
distinction between commercial and noncommercial organizations.”). 
124
 New York State Club Assoc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988) 
(finding the New York City public accommodation law did not violate 
expressive association rights of private clubs engaged in substantial 
commercial activity); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club on Duarte, 
481 U.S. 537 (1987) (holding that application of California Unruh Act 
which required California Rotary Clubs to admit women into membership 
did not interfere with the expressive association rights of the clubs). 
125
 New York State Club Assoc., 478 U.S. at 14; Rotary Club of Duarte, 
481 U.S. at 548-49. 
126
 See Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. at 545 n.4.  For instance, Rotary 
Clubs do not take positions on public questions like the Jaycees do.  See id. 
at 548. 
127
 Actually, the Court in Rotary Club of Duarte never comes out and 
says expressly that Rotary Clubs, whose “basic goals [are] humanitarian 
service, high ethical standards in all vocations, good will, and peace,”  are 
expressive associations, but merely implies it by finding that although 
“Rotary Clubs do not take positions on ‘public questions,’ including 
political or international issues,” they "engage in a variety of commendable 
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sidesteps what groups make up expressive associations and unhelpfully 
declares that the local New York public accommodation law does not 
infringe "the ability of individuals to form associations that will advocate 
public or private viewpoints.       	 
  	               	
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 The third, and less known case from this time period, City of Dallas v. 
Stanglin,129 does provide some much needed insight into what groups do 
not constitute expressive associations.  In Stanglin, the City of Dallas 
adopted an ordinance restricting admission to specified dance halls to 
persons between the ages of 14 and 18.130   The state court of appeals found 
that these teenage dance halls violated the expressive association rights of 
teenagers to associate with those outside of their age group.131  The 
Supreme Court reversed, finding that no expressive association existed 
among the dance hall patrons.132   
Specifically, the Court found that the interest in teenagers and adults 
interacting in a dance hall environment was associational in some respects, 
but importantly did not "involve the sort of expressive association that the 
First Amendment has been held to protect."133   The Court clarified that 
merely being patrons of the same business establishment does not qualify a 
group as an expressive association.  Instead, the group must take a position 
on public questions or engage in some of the charitable or civic activities 
described in the previous Supreme Court expressive association cases.134 
Although this discussion of expressive associations went further in 
explaining what groups do not constitute expressive associations, the court 
itself recognized the analytical dilemma surrounding these cases when it 
observed that, "[i]t is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost 
every activity a person undertakes 	          !       	  
 	    !    "	     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135
  But having made this observation, the Court conclusorily 
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service activities that are protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 548. 
128
 New York State Club Association, 487 U.S. at 13.  
129
 490 U.S. 19 (1989). 
130
 Id. at 20. 
131
 Id. at 21. 
132
 Id. at 25. 
133
  Id. at 24.  
134
 Id. at 24-25. On this point, the Staglin Court makes clear that 
associations do not have to engage in politics to benefit from expressive 
association rights.  Id. at 25. 
135
 Id. at 25. 
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states: “We think the activity of these dance-hall patrons--coming together 
to engage in recreational dancing--is not protected by the First 
Amendment.”136 Yet another example by which to analogize to subsequent 
cases, but not a concrete definition to apply going forward in making 
distinctions between expressive associations and non-expressive 
associations.  
 
3. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 
 
Unlike Roberts, Rotary Club of Duarte, New York State Club 
Association, and Stanglin, the Court in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale137  
found in favor of a group claiming expressive association rights.138   In an 
opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the court held that the New 
Jersey state public accommodation statute impermissibly infringed on the 
expressive association rights of the Boy Scouts by requiring them to have a 
gay assistant scoutmaster as a member.139   

136
 Id. 
137
 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
138
 Id. at 659.  If one is considering expressive association cases 
chronologically, one may think that the case of Hurley v. Irish-American 
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995), 
should be discussed next.  But Hurley, concerning the exclusion of a gay 
pride group from a privately-organized St. Patrick's Day parade in Boston, 
is not properly labeled an expressive association case.  Finding parades to 
be inherently expressive, the Hurley Court concluded that the parade 
organizers could select "the expressive units of the parade from potential 
participants," so as not to broadcast a message with which they disagreed.  
Id. at 574.  But as Justice Stevens correctly noted in his Dale dissent, 
Hurley is not an expressive association case because: "Hurley involved the 
parade organizers' claim to determine the content of the message they wish 
to give at a particular time and place.  The standards governing such a claim 
are simply different from the standards that govern [the Boy Scout of 
America]'s claim of a right of expressive association …. An expressive 
association claim … normally involves the avowal and advocacy of a 
consistent position on some issue over time." Dale, 530 U.S. at 696 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Consequently, although other commentators have 
discussed Hurley as an expressive association case, see Morriss, supra note 
8, at 442-43, this article does not treat it as such. 
139
 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 657-59.  More specifically, after finding the 
Boy Scouts to be an expressive association, the Court deferred to the 
group's description of both its message concerning homosexuality and what 
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As far as whether the Boy Scouts were an expressive association, the 
Court states unequivocally that the first thing that a court should do in an 
expressive association is "determine whether the group engages in 
'expressive association.’”140  Next, the Court cautions that the expressive 
association right is not reserved for advocacy groups (such as the NAACP), 
"[b]ut to come within its ambit, a group must engage in some form of 
expression, whether it be public or private."141  Having set forth this rather 
broad definition, the Court examines the record, including the Boy Scouts' 
mission statement, and concludes that the group's mission is "to instill 
values in young people" through activities like camping, archery, and 
fishing.142  Based on this mission, the Court concludes: "It seems 
indisputable that an association that seeks to transmit such a system of 
values engages in expressive activity."143  And although Justice Steven's 

would impair that message and found that the New Jersey law substantially 
interfered with their expressive association rights by forcing the Scouts to 
accept a gay assistant scoutmaster.  See Dale, 530 U.S. at 651-653.  The 
Court then concluded that given the severity of the intrusion into the Boy 
Scouts' rights to expressive association by the public accommodation 
statute, the Boy Scouts' First Amendment rights prevailed.  See id. at 657-
659.  These portions of the Dale opinion are discussed in more detail below.  
See infra Part IV.A. 
140
 Id. at 648. 
141
 Id. 
142
 See id. at 649. 
143
 See id. at 650 (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 
636 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).  The Court's formulation that "[i]t 
seems indisputable" is a rather bizarre way of concluding that the Boy 
Scouts qualify as an expressive association, see id., and wholly 
unconvincing when one considers that, “the Court itself implicitly disputed 
[the “transmits values” basis] in Runyon v. McCrary when it held that a 
racist private school had no First Amendment entitlement to exclude black 
children from its student body.”  See Hills, supra note 113, at 215 (citing 
Runyon, 427 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1976)). 
Also interesting, although Chief Justice Rehnquist cites Justice 
O'Connor's concurrence in Roberts as support for his conclusion that the 
Boy Scouts are an expressive association, he does not adopt her expressive 
association/commercial association dichotomy from that same concurrence.  
It is thus appears that the same Dale analysis may apply in the employment 
context, as long as the employer sets out to engage in some expressive 
activity beyond a de minimis level.  
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dissent takes the majority to task for other reasons,144 he does not dispute 
that the Boy Scouts are an expressive association.145 
The Dale Court thus follow Roberts in making clear that initially 
determining whether a group constitutes an expressive association is 
essential to determine whether there has been a violation of the right to 
expressive association under the First Amendment.146  Yet, the opinion 
provides no workable definition for this determination.147  As before, we 
know that the Boy Scouts, like law firms, private schools, social 
organizations, and advocacy groups, are expressive associations because the 
Supreme Court tells us so.  But again, at the risk of being redundant, there is 
no overarching principle. 
Indeed, it is this historical inability of the Court to provide a more 
complete definition for expressive associations that is responsible, at least to 
some degree, for permitting a unanimous Court in FAIR to overlook the 
ways in which FAIR is, and is not, an expressive association.  In turn, this 
state of affairs leads the Court inexorably, through omission, to its 
unintended conclusion that public law school members of FAIR have 
expressive association rights.  
 
4. Post-Dale Circuit Court Opinions on Expressive Associations  
 
Even with the lack of guidance from previous Supreme Court cases, the 
Supreme Court in FAIR had other potential sources for finding a principled 
way of determining the existence of an expressive association and might 
still have avoided its constitutional faux pas.  Following the decision in 
Dale, a number of federal appellate courts tried to fill the gaps left in the 

144
 See infra Part IV.B. 
145
 See Carpenter, supra note 63, at 1537 ("This is a bigger concession 
than it first appears because what makes the [Boy Scouts] an expressive 
association is not the political causes it pursues.  It does not pursue any, in 
the usual sense."). 
146
 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 648. 
147
 Accord Morriss, supra note 8, at 451 (arguing that Supreme Court’s 
Dale-based jurisprudence fails to give much guidance about how to 
distinguish expressive associations from non-expressive associations); Hills, 
supra note 113, at 215 (“[T]he Dale majority seems to place no meaningful 
limits on the definition of ‘expressive associations.’”).  
    Professor Morriss explains that this lack of guidance may be due to 
the fact that the Court so far has decided easy cases with regard to whether a 
group constitutes an expressive association, and “so the examples drawn 
from the cases leave significant gaps unfilled”  Id. 
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Court’s reasoning about which groups could qualify as expressive 
associations.148  Two in particular deserve special attention given their 
relative clarity of thought on the issue: Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity v. Univ. of 
Pittsburgh149 and The Circle School v. Pappert,150 both out of the Third 
Circuit. 
The Pi Lambda Phi considered whether a university fraternity was an 
expressive association entitled to protection under the First Amendment 
after the university stripped it of its status as a recognized student 
organization after it was the subject of a drug raid at its fraternity house.151  
As instructed by the Supreme Court in Dale, Judge Becker started his 
analysis by considering whether the fraternity was an expressive 
association.152  Interestingly, even after recognizing that the Supreme Court 
did "not set a very high bar for expressive association," it found the 
fraternity did not qualify.153 
More specifically, the court found that it was not enough merely to say 
that the group was a social association and it was necessary to inquire more 
deeply into the nature of the association.154  Based on past language in 
Roberts and Dale, the court commented that there was no requirement that 
the group be political or even primarily expressive in order to qualify for 
constitutional protection.155  Nevertheless, there was, in the court's words, a 
"de minimis threshold," for such expressive association claims156  and not 
"any possible expression" would do.157  The court concludes that the 
fraternity did not meet this de minimis threshold because "[n]othing in the 

148
 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in the Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity 
v. Univ. of Pittsburgh decision put it diplomatically when it said the 
Supreme Court's analysis in Dale of whether a group is engaging in 
expressive association was "very succinct." 229 F.3d 435, 443 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
149
 229 F.3d 435 (3d Cir. 2000). 
150
 381 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2004). 
151
 See Pi Lambda Phi, 229 F.3d at 438-39. 
152
 See id. 
153
 Id. 
154
  Id. at 442-43. 
155
 See id. at 443. 
156
 Id. at 443-44 (citing City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989) 
(holding that patrons in dance hall not engaged in expressive association)). 
157
 Id. at 444. (emphasis in original). Judge Becker here cites Stanglin 
for the proposition that there has to be more than just a "kernel of 
expression" to bring an activity within the protection of the First 
Amendment.  Id. (quoting Staglin, 490 U.S. at 25).  
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record indicates the Chapter ever took a public stance on any issue of 
public, political, social, or cultural importance."158    
Circle School v. Pappert, decided four years later, also examined the 
expressive association issue post-Dale, but found that the private schools at 
issue were expressive associations and their rights were violated by a 
Pennsylvania law which required these schools to hold recitations of the 
Pledge of Allegiance or national anthem at beginning of each school day.159   
With regard to whether the private school plaintiffs were expressive 
associations, Judge Sloviter found that like the Boy Scouts in Dale, the 
private schools engaged in "some form of expression, whether it be public 
or private."160   Looking at the record in the case, the court noted that each 
of the schools had clear educational philosophies, missions, and goals, 
including the mission of providing students with “freedom of choices.”161  
Indeed, the court found that schools, by their very nature, are highly 
expressive organizations which inculcate their students with their 
philosophy and values.162  Thus, combining an analysis of the type of 
institution being examined with a more case specific exploration of the 
record, the court was able to conclude that these schools were expressive 
associations.163 
Both Pi Lambda Phi and The Circle School provide a more specific 
framework for how to appropriately undertake the initial expressive 
association determination.  By looking at the nature of the organization, the 
purposes for which it is claiming expressive association rights, and the 
actual evidence of the record, these courts are able to make a more 
grounded determination of the issue.164  On the other side of the question, as 
far as limiting such rights, these cases also stand for the proposition that 

158
 Id.  However, the court clarifies that fraternities per se were not 
excluded from being expressive associations, but that each entity must be 
considered individually.  Id.  
159
 Circle School, 381 F.3d at 174. 
160
 Id. at 182 (citing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 
(2000)). 
161
 Id. 
162
 Id. 
163
 Id. Having thus concluded, the court held that the Pennsylvania 
pledge law placed a substantial burden on the schools' expressive 
associations without compelling justification and found a First Amendment 
violation. See id. at 182-83. 
164
 This is not to say, however, that these cases provide defining 
principles, but only that their analysis is more thorough and well-supported 
than previous Supreme Court decisions in the expressive association area. 
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even though the Supreme Court has "cast a fairly wide net" in defining 
expressive associations;165 nevertheless, a group "must do more than simply 
claim to be an expressive association."166   
Unfortunately, even this last, most basic of points did not register on the 
Supreme Court's radar in FAIR.       
 
 IV.THE DELETERIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF PUBLIC EMPLOYER 
EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATIONS 
 
A.  From Military Recruiting to Public Employment 

Of course, and as discussed in Part II, the United States Supreme Court 
in Rumsfeld v. FAIR neither followed the expressive association analysis put 
forth by these two Third Circuit opinions, nor did it even follow the clear 
three-step analysis for expressive association cases set out by Dale or by the 
Third Circuit in its FAIR opinion.167  Had it taken the time to consider that 
law schools may be expressive associations for certain limited purposes, but 
not for others, and that private and public law schools should be treated 
differently for expressive association purposes given the constitutional 
issues at stake, it might not have stumbled into this Serbonian bog.168  More 

165
 Pi Lambda Phi, 229 F.3d at 443. 
166
 Id. at 444. 
167
 Unlike the Supreme Court, the Third Circuit in FAIR methodically 
set out the elements of the expressive association claim and then considered 
each of those elements in turn.  See FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 231 
(3d Cir. 2004). On whether FAIR was an expressive association, the Third 
Circuit concluded that it was because it possessed "clear educational 
philosophies, missions, and goals."  Id. (citing FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. 
Supp. 2d 269, 303-04 (D.N.J. 2003)).  However, the Third Circuit (as well 
as the New Jersey District Court) also failed to appreciate the consequences 
of finding public law school to be expressive associations, and this fact 
suggests that even if the Supreme Court had engaged in a more thorough 
expressive association analysis, it too might have still not considered the 
public law school issue lurking in this case.    
168
See Difelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 454 & n.1 (3d 
Cir. 2003) ("A gulf profound as that Serbonian bog, / Betwixt Damiata and 
Mount Cassius old, / Where armies whole have sunk.") (citing Milton, 
Paradise Lost, ii. 592); see also McGowan, supra note x, at 132 (“Neither 
Roberts nor Dale actually develops a theory of group expression. This lack 
of development is a problem. One cannot analyze expressive association 
cases without some underlying theory of how associations express 
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specifically, had the FAIR Court considered cases like Pi Lambda Phi and 
The Circle School, it might have recognized that although schools are 
generally highly expressive organizations; nevertheless, schools can, and 
do, express themselves in more ways that just inculcating their students 
with values.169  For instance, schools also express themselves by engaging 
in the four essential freedoms, as termed by Justice Frankfurter in his 
concurrence in Sweezy v. New Hampshire.170   
Arguing for the exclusion of the government from the intellectual life of 
the university, Frankfurter famously stated in his Sweezy concurrence: "It is 
the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most 
conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in 
which there prevail 'the four essential freedoms' of a university--to 
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be 
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study."171  Each 
of these freedoms is arguably a type of expression, including the ability of 
the university to determine for itself who shall teach.  Consequently, the 
Court's finding in FAIR is not necessarily limited to the law schools' 
advocacy against the DADT policy, but could also be seen as protecting the 
law schools in deciding whom they wish to teach at their institutions.172 
This is because the FAIR court does not indicate that FAIR has been 
found to be an expressive association for the limited purpose of protesting 
military recruiters on campus, and there is no reason to think that a public 
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themselves.”). 
169
 Perhaps in this regard the FAIR Court was merely deferring, 
consistent with Dale, to FAIR's own assertions concerning the character of 
its expressive association.  See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 
653 (2000).  In its trial brief to the Court, FAIR claimed the control over on-
campus law school recruiting was "about the freedom of law schools to 
shape their own pedagogical environments and to teach, by word and deed, 
the values they choose, free from government intrusion."  See Memorandum 
of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1, 
FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004) (No. 03 Civ. 4433 (JCL)); 
see also FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 304 (D.N.J. 2003) ("The 
record reveals that the law schools … seek to inculcate a certain set of 
values and principles in their students.").  
170
 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
171
 Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result). 
172
 Like other groups and associations, employers may engage in some 
form of expressive activity. Cf. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 
640, 678-79 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing employers as 
expressive associations and limits on such associational rights). 
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law school's expressive association rights cannot equally extend to the 
employment context.173  Indeed, the Hishon case suggests that employers 
who have expressive purposes may be deemed expressive associations.174  
Finally, to recognize that all pubic employers have expressive association 
rights like the Boy Scouts in Dale is simply a matter of acknowledging that 
public law schools are just one potential type of public employer.175   
To see why this interpretation of the law, if adopted, would be so 
damaging, it is necessary to revisit the Dale decision to see what types of 
constitutional protections groups enjoy once deemed expressive 
organizations. 
 
B.  The Impact of Dale Deference on Public Employee Civil Rights  

In discussing the nature of the right to expressive association in Boy 
Scouts of America v. Dale,176 the Supreme Court gave some important 
additional powers to expressive associations to be free from government 
regulation that did not exist previously under Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees177 and which could have sweeping consequences for federal and 
state antidiscrimination laws.178  Indeed, as Justice Stevens comments in his 

173
 Although employment relationship are not directly discussed, the 
FAIR decision does indirectly suggest that covered membership decisions 
might include employment ones. Cf. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1312 ("Law 
schools … 'associate' with military recruiters in the sense they interact with 
them.  But recruiters are not part of the law school."); id. at 1313 ("The 
Solomon Amendment has no similar effect on a law school's associational 
rights.  Students and faculty are free to associate to voice their approval of 
the military's message; nothing about the statute affects the composition of 
the group by making group membership less desirable.").  
174
 Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984).  
175
 Accord Carpenter, supra note 63, at 1564 (maintaining expressive 
associations like the Boy Scouts in Dale should be protected in their 
selection of members and employees).  This is not to say that all 
employment decisions undertaken by an expressive association are subject 
to associational freedoms.  As Professor Carpenter points out, a school 
might have expressive association rights when it chooses teachers, but it 
might not have such a right when selecting maintenance or secretary 
personnel.  See id. at 1577. Whereas the former employees are central to the 
expressive activity of the schools, the latter are not. 
176
 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
177
 468 U.S. 609 (1984).  
178
 McGowan, supra note 13, at 125 (maintaining that, “[t]he Court's 
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Dale dissent, the amount of deference given to the Boy Scout's assertions 
concerning the nature of their expressive activities is simply astounding.179  
For instance, once a group is considered an expressive association, a 
court must determine the nature of the group's expression.180  However, the 
scope of that inquiry is limited and the Court indicated in Dale that it was 
proper not only to give deference to an association's assertions regarding the 
nature of its expression, but also to the association's view of what would 
impair that expression.181  So, in Dale, even though the evidence was 
extremely thin that the Boy Scouts were actually promoting an anti-
homosexual message,182 the Court deferred to its anti-homosexual 
assertions and also to the claim that inclusion of a gay assistant scoutmaster 
would force the organization to send a message inconsistent with the Boy 

stated deference [in Dale] was inconsistent with its analysis in prior 
cases.”). 
179
 See Dale, 530 U.S, at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Once the 
organization 'asserts' that it engages in particular expression …. '[w]e 
cannot doubt' the truth of that assertion.  This is an astounding view of the 
law.") (internal citations omitted); id. ("It is an odd form of independent 
review that consists of deferring entirely to whatever a litigant claims."); see 
also Hills, supra note 113, at 215 (“[O]ne looks in vain to Dale for some 
persuasive, principled, or even predictable limit on the First Amendment 
protections enjoyed by associations.”).   
180
 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 650. 
181
 See id. at 653.  Going even further, the Court went on to say that, 
"associations do not have to associate for the 'purpose' of disseminating a 
certain message in order to be entitled to the protections of the First 
Amendment.  An association must merely engage in expressive activity that 
could be impaired in order to be entitled to protection."  Id. at 655. 
Consequently, in the employment context, an employer could claim that 
hiring a certain individual as a member of its organization is inconsistent 
with its views on a certain controversial topic, even though it did not engage 
in that hiring for the purpose of taking a stance on that topic.  
182
 See id. at 670 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In light of [the Boy Scouts of 
America]'s self-proclaimed ecumenism . . . it is even more difficult to 
discern any shared goals or common moral stance on homosexuality."); se 
also id. at 675 ("Beyond the single sentence in these policy statements, 
there is no indication of any shared goal of teaching that homosexuality is 
incompatible with being 'morally straight' and 'clean.'"); id. at 684 ("There 
is no shared goal or collective effort to foster a belief about homosexuality 
at all--let alone one that is significantly burdened by admitting 
homosexuals.").   
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Scout's stance on homosexuality.183  Indeed, based on the Boy Scouts' 
assertions, it found that the New Jersey public accommodations law, which 
would have required inclusion of the gay assistant scoutmaster, caused a 
"severe intrusion" on the Boy Scouts' rights to freedom of expressive 
association that outweighed any countervailing compelling interest that the 
state had in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination from society.184  
Dale thus establishes that the expressive association determination is 
fraught with significant legal implications for those who seek to become 
members of these expressive groups, including their ability to rely on 
federal and state antidiscrimination laws.185  
It may first appear that FAIR, which does not concern a membership 
situation like Dale,186 does not have much to add to Dale as far as the 

183
 See id. at 648 ("Forcing a group to accept certain members may 
impair the ability of the group to express those views, and only those views, 
that it intends to express. Thus, '[f]reedom of association . . . plainly 
presupposes a freedom not to associate.'") (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623).  
Justice Stevens rightly criticized the majority decision for kow-towing to 
the litigation posture of the Boy Scouts, rather than conducting an 
independent analysis of whether the Boy Scouts were in fact expressing an 
anti-homosexual lifestyle message.  See id.  at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
Stevens would require instead that a group adopt and advocate an 
unequivocal position before permitting assertions of an expressive 
association right.  See id. at 687; see also id. at 696 ("An expressive 
association claim … normally involves the avowal and advocacy of a 
consistent position on some issue over time.").  But see Carpenter, supra 
note 63, at 1542-63 (criticizing Justice Steven's message-based approach on 
four different grounds). 
184
 Although Dale appears to imply that the state has a compelling 
interest in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination, it does not come 
out and say it expressly as in previous cases.  See id. at 658.  Furthermore, 
the Court lessens the importance of that compelling interest by saying that, 
"the association interest in freedom of expression has been set on one side 
of the scale, and State's interest on the other."  Id. at 658-59.  
185
 See Farber, supra note 9, at 1492-93 (“[T]he upshot of the majority 
opinion seems to be that once an association is identified as expressive, any 
colorable claim of interference with its activities is enough to block 
application of anti-discrimination laws (at least in cases where the Court 
does not find the particular state interest particularly compelling).”). 
186
 See Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1312 (2006); see also 
Morriss, supra note 8, at 451. Professor Morriss argues that whereas 
previous cases have dealt with the expressiveness of association, the 
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consequences of labeling an organization an expressive association.  But as 
discussed above, FAIR can be read as providing expressive association 
rights to public law schools.187  In fact, combining the holdings in FAIR and 
Dale leads to the startling conclusion that public employers can engage in 
expressive activities, define the nature of their expressive association, 
determine which prospective or current employees impair the message of 
their association, and then disassociate from those individuals (by not hiring 
or taking other adverse employment action), all without violating 
potentially applicable federal and state antidiscrimination law.188   To make 
these consequences more concrete, take just a few hypotheticals.  
First, consider a city police force that fires a female police offer on the 
grounds that rather than carry a fetus to term, she has an abortion.  The 
police department wishes to propound a particular point of view that 
abortion is inconsistent with its mission of protecting the lives of the 
innocent and believes that the continued employment of the female police 
officer would impair that message.  As will be discussed in more detail 
below,189 that female police officer might have substantive due process 
arguments in her favor in light of Lawrence v. Texas,190 but it is anyone's 
guess whether those interests would be considered compelling enough to 
overcome the "severe intrusion" on the police force's expressive association 
rights occasioned by having to maintain the employment of that police 
officer.  Moreover, to the extent that the female police officer counters with 
a claim of sex discrimination, it is likely that such a claim will be trumped 

Supreme Court in FAIR should have focused on the associational nature of 
the expressiveness, see id., and found that law schools and law faculties are 
not such independent associations.  See id. at 457. As it turns out, the 
Supreme Court chose not utilize Professor Morriss’ argument in its analysis.  
187
 See supra Parts II.C, IV.A. 
188
 As Justice Stevens observes in his Dale dissent, this aspect of Dale 
seems completely at odds with previous expressive association cases which 
found that right to expressive association did not mean "that in every setting 
in which individuals exercise some discrimination in choosing associates, 
their selective process of inclusion and exclusion is protected by the 
Constitution."  See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. 640, 678 (2000) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing New York State Club Assn. Inc. v. City of 
New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988)); see also Farber, supra note 9, at 1492-
93 (suggesting Dale could mean that associational rights trump contrary 
civil rights under antidiscrimination law). 
189
 See infra Part IV.C.2. 
190
 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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by the police department's associational rights under the Dale analysis.191  
Second, contemplate for a moment the hypothetical brought up by 
Justice Souter in his Dale dissent, in which an individual becomes "so 
identified with a position as to epitomize it publicly."192  Once a group is 
recognized as an expressive association, Justice Souter indicates that such 
high profile individuals may be excluded by those expressive groups to 
maintain the effectiveness of their message, even if such exclusions would 
normally run afoul of otherwise applicable federal and state 
antidiscrimination laws.193 Needless to say, Justice Souter's hypothetical 
could easily apply to the employment context.  
Finally, reflect on the lower court decision in the FAIR case itself.  The 
district court concluded that since the law schools had adopted official 
policies with respect to sexual orientation, the law schools qualify as 
expressive associations.194   In coming to this conclusion, the court noted 
that FAIR law schools believe that "invidious discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation is a moral wrong, and that 'judgments about people 
bearing no relation to merit harm and inhibits students, faculty, and 
eventually society at large.'"195  Given the nature of the law schools' 
expressive association, and Dale's notion that courts should defer to group's 
notion about what would impair their expression,196 it would appear that a 
FAIR law school could argue that hiring a prospective faculty member with 
a background in the military's JAG Corp. would be tantamount to hiring a 
person with anti-gay views and refuse to hire such a person.  As absurd as 
that claim may sound to some, remember that Dale counsels extreme 
deference to both the nature of an association's expression, as well as what 

191
 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 659 (finding Boy Scouts' expressive 
association rights outweigh any competing state interests in eradicating 
discrimination). 
192
 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 672 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
193
 See id. ("When that position is at odds with a group's advocated 
position, applying an antidiscrimination statute to require the group's 
acceptance of the individual in a position of group leadership could so 
modify or muddle or frustrate the group's advocacy as to violate the 
expressive associational right.").  Justice Souter also makes clear that the 
popularity or unpopularity of the group's message will be irrelevant in such 
situations. See id. ("[I]t is at least clear that our estimate of the progressive 
character of the group's position will be irrelevant to the First Amendment 
analysis if such a case comes to us for decision."). 
194
 FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 304 (D.N.J. 2003). 
195
 Id. 
196
 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 653. 
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would impair that expression.197  And if that member of the military makes 
a claim of discrimination based on veterans' status under a state 
employment antidiscrimination statute, he or she would probably lose as a 
result of the law school's contrary associational claims. 
In short, and as these examples make clear, the recognition of 
expressive association rights for public law schools, and by extension all 
public employers, would entail a vast accretion of employer power to 
potentially exclude unpopular, controversial, or just plain disagreeable, 
employees from the public sector.  Even more troubling, this power to 
exclude employees would be largely immunized from antidiscrimination 
laws.198 
 
C.  The Effects of Public Employer Expressive Association Rights on 
Existing Public Employee Constitutional Rights 
 
As detrimental as Dale expressive association rights might be in the 
public employment context for employee civil rights, this constitutional 
development also bodes ill for already vastly diminished constitutional 
rights of public employees.   Even under the present state of affairs, since 
public employee free speech rights reached their apogee in Pickering v. Bd. 
of Education,199 such rights have been greatly weakened in the last forty 
years as a result of the "public concern" test of Connick v. Myers,200 and the 
more recent "official capacity speech" test of Garcetti v. Ceballos.201 
 But the situation would become even worse with the recognition of 
public employer expressive association rights.  Quite simply, it is a zero-
sum game and whatever additional leverage the government obtains to 
make employment decisions through these new expressive association 
rights must necessarily lead to public employees having less constitutional 
protection against such decisions.  A couple real world examples, one 
academic in the First Amendment context and one non-academic in the 

197
 Id. at 653. 
198
 There is a counter-argument that since Dale was decided in 2000 
there has not been many private employers advancing associational claims 
with a related reduction of employee civil rights in the private sector.  
However, whereas Hishon did not clearly establish employer expressive 
association claims (and even seems to argue against them under the facts of 
that case), FAIR may be more readily interpreted to provide for such claims 
in both the public and private employment sector.  Only time will tell. 
199
 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
200
 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
201
 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006). 
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substantive due process context, will suffice to illustrate the point. 
 
1. The Case of Robert Delahunty 

A controversy erupted at the University of Minnesota Law School202 in 
late Fall 2006, involving the hiring of a visiting constitutional law professor 
from the University of St. Thomas Law School, Robert Delahunty.203  
Professor Delahunty held a previous position in the Justice Department's 
Office of Legal Counsel, where he co-authored the now-infamous torture 
memo on war prisoners.204  When word got out that Minnesota planned to 
appoint Professor Delahunty to this position, a number of Minnesota law 
professors sent an open letter205 and a significant number of students 
circulated a petition, both protesting the appointment as being antithetical to 
the core values held by the institution.206  Specifically, the student petition 
stated: "We would like to make clear that we are supportive of an 
ideologically diverse faculty, we would simply prefer that the University be 
extremely protective of its reputation by hiring faculty that are beyond 
question ethically."207  As it turns out, the interim co-dean of the University 

202
 Interestingly, the Faculty of the University of Minnesota Law School 
is one of the public law school members of FAIR.  See supra note x. 
203
 See Paul D. Thacker, Appointment Roils a Law School, INSIDE 
HIGHER ED, at http://insidehighered.com/news/2006/11/29/delahunty 
(November 29, 2006). 
204
See id. The memo "concluded that the Geneva Convention did not 
cover al-Qaeda suspects captured in Afghanistan, and helped lay the 
foundation for the Bush administration’s handling of prisoners captured 
during the war on terror." Id.; see also generally Robert J. Delahunty & 
John C. Yoo, The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military 
Operations Against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations that Harbor or 
Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL’Y 487 (2002). 
205
 See Thacker, supra note 206 (link to faculty letter available in 
article). 
206
 See id. 
207
 See Petition to Ask the Deans to Reconsider the Hiring of Robert 
Delahunty, available at http://insidehighered.com/news/2006/11/29/ 
delahunty (November 29, 2006) (click on "circulating a petition" link in 
article).  The petition went on to state: "We place a considerable value on 
the reputation that comes with being in a law school with this level of 
prestige, and we would like to avoid any negative connotations that will 
result from hiring a person with such a negative and divisive reputation as 
Delahunty."  See id. 
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of Minnesota did not to bow to the pressure not to appoint Delahunty and 
Delahunty began teaching classes at Minnesota Law in mid-January 2007.  
Nevertheless, the story provides an opportunity to consider what the 
detrimental impact would be on public employees' First Amendment rights 
if a public law school had constitutional rights of expressive association.208 
In this regard, Roberts v. United States Jaycees makes clear that expressive 
associations have the right to be free from "intrusion into the[ir] internal 
structure of affairs,"209 and such groups cannot be forced, without 
compelling justification, to accept members they do not desire.210  And 
although compelling justifications may have existed for the Jaycees and 
Rotarians to be forced to have female members,211 it is unlikely that the 
same level of justification exists to force Minnesota Law School to 

208
 Now, it may be that the First Amendment rights of public employees 
like Delahunty are already, without any consideration of expressive 
association rights, severely circumscribed by the "government speech" 
doctrine, under which the government employer may claim, without First 
Amendment concern, the ability to hire only those individuals willing to 
transmit its values or propound its chosen point of view.  See Johanns v. 
Livestock Marketing Assn., 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005) ("[I]t seems 
inevitable that funds raised by the government will be spent for speech and 
other expression to advocate and its own policies.  We have generally 
assumed…that compelled funding of government speech does not along 
raise First Amendment concerns."); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-93 
(1991) ("[G]overnment may 'make a value judgment favoring childbirth 
over abortion, and . . . implement that judgment by the allocation of public 
funds.'") (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).  As will be 
explored below, however, the government speech doctrine is probably most 
tenuous in the public university professor context.  See infra Part V.B.2.        
209
  Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (citing 
Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1975)).  The Court notes in 
Roberts that associational rights can also be unconstitutionally infringed by 
governmental action in one of two other ways: (1) by imposing penalties or 
withholding benefits from individuals because of their membership in a 
disfavored group, see id. at 622 (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-
84 (1972)); and (2) requiring disclosure of the fact of membership in a 
group seeking anonymity.  Id. at 622-23 (citing Brown v. Socialist Workers 
'74 Campaign Committee, 459 U.S. 87, 91-92 (1982)).   
210
 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.  In other words, the freedom of association 
plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.  Id. 
211
 See id. at 624; Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club on Duarte, 
481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987).  
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associate with Delahunty.   
  Furthermore, the Court in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale gave great 
deference to not only the group's assertions about the nature of their 
expression, but also to its views about what would impair that expression.212  
Thus, in a world where a public law school has expressive association 
rights, the school might not hire a Professor Delahunty in order a transmit a 
certain set of values, and not others.213  Indeed, the student petition against 
Delahunty relied on an argument of this type when it requested that the 
Minnesota Law School not affiliate with anyone of questionable ethical 
background.214  Finally, recall that Justice Souter indicated in his Dale 
dissent that in cases where a high profile individual becomes the public 
embodiment of a certain controversial position, like Delahunty has on the 
torture issue, expressive associations should be able to insulate their 
expression by disassociating from such individuals.215 
Professor Delahunty would likely respond to this invocation of 
expressive association rights by the law school by claiming that his past 
stance on matters of public concern are protected from adverse employment 
actions by the First Amendment.  Indeed, cases like Pickering v. Bd. of 
Education216 and Connick v. Myers217 stand for the proposition that public 
employee have certain rights to speech and expression for which they 
cannot be retaliated against, unless the public employer can point to 

212
 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000). 
213
 Stanley Fish, for one, does not agree that, “schools should[] have 
values, except in a very narrow sense,” and " should avoid taking a political 
stance at all cost."  Indeed, Fish brought up the FAIR case to illustrate his 
point.  See Elia Powers, A Freewheeling Academic Freedom Debate, INSIDE 
HIGHER ED, at http://insidehighered.com/news/2007/01/05/acfreedom 
(January 5, 2007) (describing remarks Fish made during the 2007 Annual 
Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS)). 
214
 See supra note x and accompanying text. 
215
 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 672 (Souter, J., dissenting).  Of course in 
Justice Souter's hypothetical, he was suggesting that such expressive 
association rights of a group would overcome any contrary 
antidiscrimination mandates. See id.  Because Professor Delahunty is not 
likely to be able to claim the protection of such laws (as ideological 
discrimination is not a protected statutory category), it is less likely that his 
hiring decision would be even more susceptible to a expressive association 
claim. 
216
 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
217
 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
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overriding and legitimate efficiency interests.218  But Pickering First 
Amendment claims are rather weak ones in the constitutional hierarchy of 
rights, given the needs of government employers to run their workplaces.219   
Such rights, even under present doctrine, may be overcome by the mere 
showing by the employer that the employee's expression would 
substantially disrupt their enterprise.220  On the other hand, expressive 
association rights are much more sacrosanct and may be overcome only "by 
regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the 
suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly, 
less restrictive of associational freedoms."221 
Consequently, if one were to balance public employer expressive 
association rights against public employee Pickering First Amendment 
rights, given the nature of the interests involved, it is more than likely that 
the government employer would prevail in the vast majority of these cases.  
Put differently, it is unlikely that the somewhat attenuated public employee 
right to free speech would qualify as the compelling state interest necessary 
to overcome the public employer's expressive association rights.  In short, 
this hypothetical exercise indicates that recognition of public law school 
expressive association rights in a case like Delahunty's would almost 
certainly diminish individual public employee's rights to free speech and 
expression.222    
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218
 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; Connick, 461 U.S. at 143-44. 
219
 See Paul M. Secunda, The (Neglected) Importance of Being 
Lawrence: The Constitutionalization of Public Employee Rights to 
Decisional Non-Interference in Private Affairs, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 
97 (2006) (hereinafter, Secunda, Neglected Importance) ("Yet even though 
the government employer does have unfettered discretion when it comes to 
impinging upon the exercise of its employee's constitutional rights, it does 
retain substantial latitude when setting the terms and conditions of its 
employees' employment, a discretion which is not available in its dealing 
with the same individuals as citizens.") (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos,, 126 S. 
Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 
674 (1996); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671-72 (1994) (plurality 
opinion)). 
220
 See id. at 101 (discussing substantial disruption theory of Pickering 
line of cases) (citing Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee 
Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1007, 1018 (2005)). 
221
 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). 
222
 Now, some might like this outcome because they do not agree with 
Professor Delahunty's views on torture.  But one could easily imagine a 
similar case involving a public employee with more progressive views 
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2. The Case of Debora Hobbs 

 The impact of FAIR expanding expressive association rights would 
not be limited to either public law schools or to the First Amendment, as the 
next example illustrates. In a previous piece, I wrote about a female sheriff 
dispatcher, Debora Hobbs, in Penders County, North Carolina, who was 
told by her supervising sheriff, Carson Smith, to marry her live-in 
boyfriend, move out, or lose her job.223  The sheriff based his actions on a 
state cohabitation statute from 1805 and, in fact, the female dispatcher lost 
her position when she refused to comply.224  Without there being an 
expressive association right upon which the sheriff department could rely, 
the dispatcher sued in state court and won based on the court finding, in 
light of Lawrence v. Texas,225 that her firing unconstitutionally infringed her 
liberty interests under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.226  Although the state court's exact reasoning does not appear 
to have been published, it is likely that its decision is based on the 
proposition that a public employer must have a substantial and legitimate 
interest before interfering with an employee's off-duty private and personal 
decisions in matters pertaining to sex.227   
 But what if the Penders County Sheriff could claim a right to 
expressive association on behalf of the sheriffs’ department based on the 

being excluded from the association of a more conservative public law 
school.  Suppose like the Boy Scouts, a conservative public university does 
not want to hire a gay rights activist?  Again, the rights afforded to 
expressive associations under Roberts, Dale, and similar cases, would seem 
to permit the university to take this action even though this would appear to 
be an instance of a governmental entity interfering with a public employee's 
First Amendment rights. 
223
 See Secunda, supra note 222, at 131-32 (citing Steve Hartsoe, ACLU 
Challenges N.C. Cohabitation Law, WASH. POST, May 10, 2005, at A06). 
224
 See id. 
225
 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down Texas anti-sodomy statute based 
on liberty interest individuals have in making decisions about their personal 
and private lives). 
226
 See Paul M. Secunda, North Carolina Cohabitation Law Struck 
Down in Case of Female Sheriff Dispatcher, WORKPLACE PROF BLOG, at 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2006/07/north_carolina_.h
tml (July 21, 2006).  I refer to this liberty interest recognized in Lawrence 
as a public employee's right to decisional non-interference in private affairs.  
See Secunda, Neglected Importance, supra note 222, at  115-19. 
227
 See Secunda, Neglected Importance, supra note 222, at 116. 
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holding in FAIR?  The argument would go that central to maintaining the 
image and credibility of a law enforcement agency in a socially 
conservative part of the country is the ability to hire only those individuals 
who hold the traditional values of their community, including the values 
surrounding traditional forms of marriage. Thus, requiring the sheriff's 
department to maintain in employment those who choose to express other 
values by cohabitating without being married (whether they be 
heterosexuals and homosexuals) could be seen as forcing the department to 
promote non-traditional conduct outside of marriage as a legitimate form of 
behavior.  
Dale stands for the proposition that expressive associations have the 
right not to be forced to send a message that is contrary to their chosen 
beliefs.228  As discussed previously, Dale's notion is also that a court must 
defer to the organization's characterization of its expression, as well as the 
organization's belief as to what would impair it.229   These principles 
suggest that a court reviewing Penders County’s decision to fire Debora 
Hobbs for cohabitation would have little ability to inquire into the bona 
fides of the County’s putative values and would have to take the County at 
its word that its expressive association would be harmed by having as 
members those with nontraditional values such as Hobbs. 
Nor would a reading of Lawrence v. Texas that recognizes a heightened 
liberty interest in decisional non-interference in private affairs make a 
difference once public employers were endowed with expressive association 
rights.  Although the modified Pickering analysis that I previously proposed 
would not permit a public employer to interfere with its employee’s private 
and personal life (especially in matters pertaining to sex) without legitimate 
and substantial justification,230 the public employers' right to expressive 
association, to choose not to propound a point of view contrary to its belief, 
would certainly suffice as such a substantial and legitimate justification.  
Thus, recognition of public employer expressive association rights would 
also turn the clock back on public employee civil liberties outside of the 
academy and retard newly emerging substantive due process rights for 
public employees before they even had the chance to take root and flourish. 
         

228
 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 653; see also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 
468 U.S. 609, 633 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Protection of the 
association's right to define its membership derives from the recognition 
that the formation of an expressive association is the creation of a voice, 
and the selection of members is the definition of that voice."). 
229
 See id. 
230
 See Secunda, Neglected Importance, supra note 222, at 118-19. 
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V. STRUCTURAL ARGUMENTS, EFFICIENCY INTERESTS, AND THE 
GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE 
 
A.  The Structural Argument Against Public Expressive Associations 

Although there are a number of normative reasons illustrated above 
which counsel against recognizing public law schools and public employers 
as expressive associations, the most persuasive argument against the 
Supreme Court's inadvertent holding in Rumsfeld v. FAIR is a structural 
one.  It is simply this: the Bill of Rights is about protecting the rights of the 
governed, not the governing.231   
In this regard, the discussion in the recent case of Coalition to Defend 
Affirmative Action v. Granholm is instructive.232  The Coalition to Defend 
Affirmative Action case concerned whether the court should preliminarily 
enjoin the recently-adopted Michigan anti-racial-preferences amendment 
from going into effect, especially that part that applies to public 
universities.233   The court denied the sought after injunctive relief based on 

231
 Justice Stewart made this very point in his concurrence in Columbia 
Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 139 
(1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The First Amendment protects the press 
from governmental interference; it confers no analogous protection on the 
Government.").  As David Fagundes has pointed out in his recent piece on 
government speech, and though he himself thoughtfully challenges this 
notion, Stewart’s concurrence remains the majority view in this area of the 
law.  See Fagundes, supra note 78, at 1643 (“[W]hen the question of 
whether the First Amendment applies to government speech has arisen, 
judges have typically acknowledged Justice Stewart's concurrence without 
critical reflection … resulting in what one district court called ‘the well-
settled point of law that the First Amendment protects only citizens' speech 
rights from government regulation, and does not apply to government 
speech itself.’") (citing Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Holcomb, 129 
F. Supp. 2d 941, 944-45 (W.D. Va. 2001)); see also Morriss, supra note 8, 
at 440 ("These [state law school members of FAIR], as instrumentalities of 
state government, have no First Amendment rights."). 
232
 No. 06-2640, 2006 WL 3831217 (6th Cir. Dec. 29, 2006). 
233
 See id. at *1. "On November 7, 2006, the people of Michigan 
approved a statewide ballot initiative--Proposal 2--which amended the 
Michigan Constitution to prohibit discrimination or preferential treatment 
based on race or gender in the operation of public employment, public 
education, or public contracting in the State. Under the Michigan 
Constitution, the proposal was scheduled to go into effect on December 23, 
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its holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendment permit states to use 
certain forms of affirmative action, but does mandate that they do so.234 
In its losing argument, the public universities in Michigan235 argued 
that, "they have an academic freedom right, based in the First Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States, to select their students and that they 
may, in the course of doing so, give some consideration to such factors ... as 
race."236  Dismissing this argument, the Sixth Circuit made the point that 
their "interests" in selecting a diverse student body should not be confused 
with them having actual First Amendment rights.237  After all, the court 
observed, it is not at clear "how the Universities, as subordinate organs of 
the State, have First Amendment rights against the State or its voters."238  In 
other words, the Constitution protects the people from the state, not the state 
from the people.239 

2006."  Id.      
234
 Id. 
235
 The public universities are the University of Michigan, Michigan 
State University, and Wayne State University.  Id. 
236
 Id. at *3; see also id. at *9.  Interestingly, with regard to an 
institutional academic freedom right, Professor William Van Alstyne of the 
William & Mary College of Law observed at a recent panel discussion on 
academic freedom at the 2007 Annual Meeting of Association of American 
Law Schools (AALS) that although there were some 30 decisions from the 
Supreme Court using the doctrine of institutional academic freedom, not 
one of them relied directly on that right for its holding, choosing instead to 
rely on other constitutional bases. (Notes of Talk on File with Author -- 
podcast of talk should be posted soon). 
237
 See id. at *9 ("The Universities mistake interests grounded in the 
First Amendment-- including their interests in selecting student bodies--
with First Amendment rights."). 
238
 Id. (citing Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 
(1819)). 
239
 See id.; see also Fagundes, supra note 78, at 1638 ("[T]he Speech 
Clause is typically understood as a bulwark of protection against--rather 
than a source of rights for--government."); see also id. at 1639 ("Courts 
have varied in their receptivity to the notion that the First Amendment may 
extend to government speech. The majority of courts have reflexively 
rejected the notion, relying on the assumption that the First Amendment can 
only restrict, not protect, state actors.") (citing Muir v. Ala. Educ. 
Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1038 n.12 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc)). 
But see Nadel v. Regents of the University of California, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
188, 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing speech rights for government 
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Nor does the analysis change when considering one of the points 
emphasized in Grutter v. Bollinger,240 that universities' academic decisions 
should be given a substantial degree of deference by the courts.241  The 
Sixth Circuit in Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action points out that the 
Grutter Court more specifically stated that this degree of deference should 
only be granted "within constitutionally prescribed limits"242 and "[o]ne of 
those 'constitutionally prescribed limits,' . . . is the separate requirement of 
narrow tailoring-- an inquiry that no one maintains may be satisfied simply 
by invoking a university's legitimate, but hardly dispositive, interest in 
academic freedom."243  Based on this line of reasoning, the court concludes 
that the universities have no First Amendment right to continue their racial 
preferences as part and parcel of their rights to institutional academic 
freedom.244 
It then follows that if universities do not have a First Amendment right 

actors); County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1387, 
1390 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (same). 
240
 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
241
 See id. at 328-29 ("We have long recognized that, given the 
important purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of 
speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities 
occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition."). 
242
 Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 2006 WL 3831217, at *9 
(emphasis added). 
243
 Id. 
244
 See id. at *10.  But see Fagundes, supra note 78, at 1662 
(maintaining that, “[t]he majority rule proscribing constitutional status for 
government speech … fails to account for a scenario in which the federal 
government wrongly attempts to restrict the speech of another sovereign, or 
where government speech merits application of a statute or common law 
doctrine that is designed to safeguard constitutional speech interests.”). 
Although Fagundes’ thoughts on the First Amendment rights of state actors 
are thought-provoking, his categories for when government speech should 
be constitutionally protected nonetheless do not appear to cover instances in 
which state public universities or public employers seek to assert 
constitutional rights against the contrary First Amendment rights of their 
public employees.  In other words, public employment does not raise the 
more difficult question of whether a state sovereign should have 
constitutional rights against the federal sovereign under some combination 
of the 1st and 10th Amendments, see Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328, but rather 
the relatively easy question concerning whether the states should have 
constitutional rights against individuals.      
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to select diverse student bodies, then surely the university even has less of a 
right to such constitutional protections when selecting members of its 
faculty and its staff.  Although deciding whom to teach is one of the four 
essential freedom discussed by Justice Frankfurter in his concurrence in 
Sweezy just as much as deciding who to admit to study,245 the Supreme 
Court has historically given less deference to non-academic decisions by 
universities because courts are considered to have more experience with 
dealing with issue of the non-academic variety, such as disciplinary 
decisions.246  Thus, if the public universities in Coalition to Defend 
Affirmative Action do not have First Amendment rights to select their 
students, they certainly should not have those rights to select their faculty.   
Given the strength of these structural arguments, it is very likely that if 
the Supreme Court were to consider the issue head on, it would not deem 
the FAIR public law schools, or any other public employer, to be expressive 
associations.  This inadvertent holding appears to have occurred as a result 
of the Court spending most of its analytical energies on more difficult areas 
in FAIR, such as the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the 
Congressional power to raise and support armies, and a number of obtuse 
First Amendment speech doctrines, including the doctrines of compelled 
speech and expressive conduct.247  Even in the expressive association 
portion of the case, the Court seems unconcerned about the nature or the 
constituents of the FAIR expressive association and focuses instead on 
whether having military recruiters on law school campuses significantly 
burdens law school rights to expressive association (answering that question 

245
 See supra note x and accompanying text. 
246
 See Regents of Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 
(1985) ("When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely 
academic decision, such as this one, they should show great respect for the 
faculty's professional judgment.  Plainly, they may not override it unless it 
is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to 
demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually 
exercise professional judgment.");  Bd. of Curators of the University of 
Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1978) ("Academic evaluations of 
a student, in contrast to disciplinary determinations, bear little resemblance 
to the judicial and administrative factfinding proceedings to which we have 
traditionally attached a full hearing requirement …. the determination 
whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert 
evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the 
procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking."). 
247
 Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1306-11 (2006). 
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in the negative).248    
In any event, because of the confusion surrounding this area of the law, 
the Court should not merely correct this oversight in the next case in which 
it has the opportunity to discuss expressive association rights, but it should 
set out a coherent understanding of what type of rights public employers, 
including public universities acting in that capacity, have in deciding how 
best to convey certain messages to the public and protect their institutions' 
core values.  In this vein, the Court should take their cue from the Sixth 
Circuit and deem such important claims to be "interests" rather than "rights" 
and analyze these interests with other governmental efficiency concerns 
under the Connick/Pickering First Amendment free speech framework.  At 
the same time, the Court should step back from the abyss it reached in 
Garcetti v. Ceballos and not too quickly assume that all government 
employees are engaged in government speech without First Amendment 
protection every time they speak or express themselves in line with their job 
duties. 
 
B.  A Return to Pickering Efficiency Interests and A Detour Around the 
Government Speech Doctrine 

1. Pickering Efficiency Interests 

To reiterate a point made in the last section, the current deference that 
courts pay to university academic judgments are better conceived of as 
interests grounded in the First Amendment, rather than constitutional rights.  
This conception of the academic employer having certain interests in 
exercising discretion in deciding who to hire and retain as employees is 
consistent with similar governmental efficiency interests already discussed 
in the Pickering line of cases.
Pickering v. Bd. of Education249 was most recently revisited by the 
Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos.250  In Ceballos, a deputy district attorney for 
Los Angeles County, Richard Ceballos, was subjected to adverse 
employment actions for speaking out about an allegedly defective search 
warrant in a criminal case.251  The question presented to the Supreme Court 
was whether Ceballos had engaged in protected speech under the First 
Amendment, such that he could not be retaliated against for his actions with 

248
 Id. at 1312.  
249
 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
250
 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006). 
251
 See id. at 1955-56. 
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regard to the search warrant.252    
In its analysis in Ceballos, the Court noted that the Connick/Pickering 
analysis requires courts in public employee free speech cases to consider 
whether the employee spoke on a matter of a public concern in his or her 
capacity as a citizen253 and if so, then balance the First Amendment interests 
of the employee against the governmental interests of the employer to run 
an efficient governmental service.254  The governmental interests 
recognized in Pickering are not in any sense constitutional rights, but rather 
a recognition of the interests a government employer has in maintaining "a 
significant degree of control over their employees' words and actions" 
because "without it, there would be little chance for the efficient provision 
of public services."255  The balance undertaken in Pickering is required 
because even though the government employer performs "these important 
public functions,"256 and consequently far broader powers in its employer 
capacity than in its sovereign capacity;257 nevertheless, "a citizen who 
works for the government is nonetheless a citizen"258 and the First 

252
 Id. at 1955.  As far as answering that question, the Court found in 
Ceballos that because Ceballos was engaged in expression consistent with 
his job duties, he was not speaking as a citizen on a matter of public 
concern, but only as a government employee. As such, the Court concluded 
that Ceballos did not have any First Amendment protection and there was 
no need to conduct a Pickering balancing of interests.  See id.  at  1960 
("We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their 
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First 
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline."). 
253
 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1983). 
254
 See Pickering v. Bd. of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).  I have 
recently argued that this same type of Pickering analysis should be extended 
to the substantive due process area in the context of sexual privacy rights in 
light of the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003).  Under this reasoning, employees should also be free from 
decisional interference by their employers in their private and personal 
affairs, unless the government can point to overriding efficiency interests.  
See Secunda, Neglected Importance, supra note 222, at 122-24. 
255
 Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. at 1958 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 143). 
256
 See id. at 1959 (citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 
(1987)). 
257
 See id. (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) 
(plurality opinion)). 
258
 Id.  
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Amendment therefore limits the ability of the employer to condition 
employment of that employee on the forfeiture of his or her constitutional 
rights.259 
Similarly, the interests that public employers have in sending and 
advocating certain views and policies and maintaining the core values of 
their institutions may be seen as more akin to Pickering efficiency interests 
than a First Amendment right to expressive association.260  As the Ceballos 
Court observed: "Supervisors must ensure that their employees' official 
communications are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote 
the employer's mission."261 In setting out the relevant interests, the Court 
utilizes the language of efficiency interests, not of employer expressive 
association rights.  This is particularly telling, since Garcetti was decided 
only about three months after Rumsfeld v. FAIR, and one would have 
expected some comment about expressive association rights if the Court 
had recognized the implications of its own statements in FAIR.   Clearly, 
however, the Court did not so understand its FAIR decision. 
In any event, based on this governmental interests analysis, if a public 
employer wishes not to hire a prospective employee because that employee 
has engaged in controversial expression through the written word, like 
Delahunty,262 or through non-traditional living arrangements, like Hobbs,263 
the proper analysis is not to suggest that the government has a constitutional 
right as an expressive association to disassociate itself from those individual 
it deems promoting an antithetical message, but to determine whether the 
constitutional rights of the individual cannot be recognized without 
substantially disrupting the public employer's enterprise.264  Again, this 

259
 See id. (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).  This 
doctrine is commonly referred as the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions, and figures prominently in Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 
1307 (2006) ("Under this principle, known as the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine, the Solomon Amendment would be unconstitutional if 
Congress could not directly require universities to provide military 
recruiters equal access to their students.").  
260
 See Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. at 1960 ("Employers have heightened 
interests in controlling speech made by an employee in his or her 
professional capacity.  Official communications have official consequences, 
creating a need for substantive consistency and clarity."). 
261
 Id. (emphasis added). 
262
 See infra Part IV.C.1. 
263
 See infra Part.IV.C.2. 
264
 I do not mean to suggest that the Pickering balance does not have its 
own shortcomings.  Its reliance on determining constitutional rights based 
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analysis is more consistent with constitutional doctrine in the public 
employer area and does not take the unprecedented step of suggesting that 
government employers have First Amendment rights. 
 
2. The Menace of the Government Speech Doctrine to Public 
Employee First Amendment Rights 

As much as Pickering provides a proper understanding of how public 
employer interests to promote certain messages should be conceived, that is 
to the degree to which the government speech doctrine has the ability to 
wreak havoc on public employees' remaining constitutional rights in a large 
sub-category of official capacity speech cases.  Specifically, in coming to its 
conclusion in Garcetti v. Ceballos that Ceballos did not have First 
Amendment rights because he was acting in accordance with his job duties, 
the Court commented that Ceballos' speech "owed its existence to [his] 
professional responsibilities" and "simply reflects the exercise of employer 
control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created."265  In 
making this point, the Court cites to the case of Rosenberger v. Rector and 
Visitors of Univ. of Va.266 with a parenthetical that, "when government 
appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is 
entitled to say what it wishes."267  This language in turn was taken from 
similar language in the abortion funding case of Rust v. Sullivan,268 which is 
considered part of the Court's ever-expanding government speech 

on whether a public employee's conduct causes his or her employer 
substantial disruption is close to approaching the constitutionalization of the 
heckler's veto.  See Kozel, supra note 223, at 1018-19 ("Such a test is 
inconsistent with the notion of robust exchange of divergent ideas, as it 
leaves vulnerable the speech that is most likely to have a strong effect."). 
265
 See Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. at 1960.  However, Ceballos leaves open the 
question of whether this holding should apply to public university 
professors, like Delahunty, as the result of their enjoying some degree of 
constitutionally protected academic freedom.  See id. at 1962 ("There is 
some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or 
classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that are 
not fully accounted for by this Court's customary employee-speech 
jurisprudence. We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the 
analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case 
involving speech related to scholarship or teaching."). 
266
 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
267
 Id. at 833. 
268
 500 U.S. 173, 174-75 (1991). 
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doctrine.269   
Under this doctrine, individuals can be compelled to subsidize 
government speech without implicating any individual First Amendment 
rights.270  The Court in Ceballos thus seems to be suggesting that 
characterizing Ceballos' expression as government speech helps to explain 
why he has no First Amendment rights when speaking in his official 
capacity, whereas normally under the Connick/Pickering framework, he 
would.  Such a broad notion of public employee speech as government 
speech, however, could all but wipe out a significant portion of public 
employee First Amendment rights.271  
Fortunately, it does not appear that the Court is willing to take the 
government speech doctrine in the public employment context to that length 
quite yet.  Instead, the cite to the Rosenberger case in Ceballos was a "cf." 
cite, suggesting that the "cited authority supports a proposition different 
from the main proposition, but sufficiently analogous to lend support."272  In 
other words, there is still room to doubt that the government speech doctrine 
applies in its adulterated form to all public employee speech cases in which 
there are statements made pursuant to official duties.  
Justice Souter in his Ceballos dissent suggests ample reason why the 
government speech analysis should be mostly extraneous to the Pickering 
doctrine.  He notes that, "[s]ome public employees are hired to 'promote a 
particular policy' by broadcasting a particular message set by the 
government, but not everyone working for the government, after all, is hired 
to speak from a government manifesto."273   Indeed, as Justice Souter points 

269
 See id. at 192-93 ("[G]overnment may 'make a value judgment 
favoring childbirth over abortion, and . . . implement that judgment by the 
allocation of public funds.'") (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 
(1977)). 
270
 See Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assn., 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005) 
("[I]t seems inevitable that funds raised by the government will be spent for 
speech and other expression to advocate its own policies.  We have 
generally assumed…that compelled funding of government speech does not 
alone raise First Amendment concerns.") (citing Board of Regents of Univ. 
of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000)). 
271
 See Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. at 1969 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The fallacy 
of the majority's reliance on Rosenberger's understanding of Rust doctrine . 
. . portends a bloated notion of controllable government speech going well 
beyond the circumstances of this case."). 
272
 THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.2(a), at 46 
(Columbia Law Review Ass'n at al. eds., 18th ed. 2005). 
273
 Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. at 1969 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Legal 
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out, there is no evidence that Ceballos himself was hired to "broadcast a 
particular message set by the government," and instead, was hired "to 
enforce the law by constitutional action."274  Similarly, returning to the 
higher education context for a moment, no one would seriously argue that 
public university professors are hired to send a particular government 
message.275  
In short, although even Justice Souter concedes that there may be some 
public employees who are hired to advance specific governmental policies 
and thus fall under the government speech doctrine, a large number of such 
employees, including government lawyers, do not.  Souter is right that "Rust 
is no authority for the notion that the government may exercise plenary 
control over every comment made by a public employee in doing his 
job."276 Here's hoping that future Courts recognize Ceballos' error in this 
regard and takes a mere "cf." cite for what it is. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Neither public law schools nor public employers have the constitutional 
right to expressive association as Rumsfeld v. FAIR mistakenly suggests. 
This inadvertent holding will eventually be rectified given the strong 
constitutional structural arguments in opposition to such an interpretation.  
But such a modification should be accompanied by a unifying theory about 
how government efficiency concerns in maintaining core values and 
promoting certain messages should be balanced against the First 
Amendment rights of public employees to engage in protected 
constitutional activities.  In some cases then public employers will be 
permitted to adhere to core values and promote certain messages as a part of 
their Pickering efficiency interests in running their organizations as they see 
fit.  Even so, these efficiency interests in the last analysis must be balanced 
against employee constitutional rights and do not simply override such 
interests.  Furthermore, the government speech doctrine should not be read 
expansively into the public employment context to strip public employees 

Services Corporation v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001)). 
274
  Id.  
275
 See id. ("This ostensible domain beyond the pale of the First 
Amendment is spacious enough to include even the teaching of a public 
university professor….").  The majority grants that different considerations 
might apply when the academic freedom concerns of professors engaged in 
teaching and scholarship are involved, but does not decide that issue since 
Ceballos itself does not concern academic freedom.  See id. at 1962. 
276
 Id. at 1969. 
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of constitutional right when they are acting pursuant to their official duties.  
Instead, that doctrine should be limited to instances where a public 
employee has been hired to actually promote a specific governmental 
message. 
In the end, only in this way will an unprecedented aggrandizement of 
constitutional power by public employers, to the detriment of public 
employees' constitutional and civil rights, be avoided. 
